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PROLOGUE
I was, until recently, a pregnant man.  I explored some of the issues that
arose along my path to parenthood in a recent essay titled Pregnant Man?: A
Conversation.1  My husband and I began the process of having a child sev-
eral years ago when we hired a surrogacy agency that works primarily with
gay male couples.  After a complex process, we are now raising our
daughter.
As a parent, I confront a far more sexed area of life than I have ever
encountered before.  Everyone congratulates my partner and me on being
“fathers,” even though within our home we share responsibilities and flip
roles, including a mothering role, with some fluidity.  The outside world, it
seems, needs to box us into the “daddy” category as much as it invests
women with the power of motherhood.
Some time ago, I was in a taxi with my daughter, riding to a law school
event at Grand Central Terminal.  She fussed a bit and the driver said,
“Where’s the mother?  Only the mother knows how to do this.”  Avoiding a
complex explanation that I view myself as both mother and father, I said she
has two dads.  He still seemed perplexed that a man could know how to care
for a child.  I left the taxi and wiped a saliva-soaked Cheerio from my
daughter’s chin, feeling less of a parent because I was perceived as only a
father, and not the primary parent—a mother.  It is a feeling constantly rein-
forced for gay male parents I know who report that when in public—at mar-
kets, stores, and restaurants—they get asked by women: “Is it mommy’s day
off?”  It is challenging to come up with a responsible response.
Behind the confusion in faces of people like the taxi driver, whom I tell
about our family structure, I can see that they are thinking that a child with-
out a mother is akin to an orphan—taken care of, but not supported and
nurtured the way only a “mother” can.  Again, “[o]nly the mother knows
how to do this.”  This is why I wanted to be a mother: because it was about
learning and knowing how to parent in the most challenging situations.  In
reality, to the extent the traditional definitions of “mother” and “father”
mean anything, many of us flip and shift among those roles.  I have begun to
wonder whether society would benefit from unsexing mothering (and father-
ing) to foster unsexed parenting.  This Article explores what that would
mean and why it is desirable.
1 Darren Rosenblum et al., Pregnant Man?: A Conversation, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMI-
NISM 207 (2010) [hereinafter Rosenblum, Pregnant Man?].
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Come, you spirits
That tend on mortal thoughts, unsex me here,
And fill me from the crown to the toe top full
Of direst cruelty!
– Lady Macbeth, gathering the strength to commit murder.2
INTRODUCTION
The fault line between formal, legal sex neutrality and the dichotomous
living of sex identity seems to be expanding.  It is a conflict that rages furi-
ously in debates over mothering and parenting.  This Article argues that le-
gal regimes governing mothering should attempt to unsex it.3
In a previous article, Unsex CEDAW, I used this same “unsex” term to
drive my argument against the exclusive focus on women’s equality in the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Wo-
men (“CEDAW” or “the Convention”).4  Whereas Lady Macbeth demands
unsexing to commit evil, CEDAW requires it to realize its worthwhile goals.
Sex and gender inequality is an interrelational phenomenon.5  Instead of fo-
cusing on “women” as part of a male/female binary, CEDAW should mini-
mize the import of the categories “man” and “woman” themselves.6
2 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 1, sc. 5.  Thanks to Bridget J. Crawford for
linking my ideas with this Shakespearean theme.
3 Thanks to Berta E. Herna´ndez-Truyol for steering me toward the “mothering”
focus.
4 Darren Rosenblum, Unsex CEDAW, or What’s Wrong with Women’s Rights, 20
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. (forthcoming 2011) [hereinafter Rosenblum, Unsex CEDAW].
5 As discussed below, the panoply of sex traits creates the potential for many sexes.
See infra note 19. R
6 Rosenblum, Unsex CEDAW, supra note 4, at 8. The Convention on the Elimination R
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979,
1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW Treaty], signed
on July 17, 1980 by sixty-four countries, has as its principal goals the protection and
promotion of women’s rights and the elimination of discrimination against women. See
Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, China, September 4–15, 1995, Progress
Achieved in the Implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, 2–5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/7 (June 21, 1995) [herein-
after Beijing Conference], available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/pdf/
Beijing%20full%20report%20E.pdf.  As of October 24, 2011, 187 countries—more than
90 percent of United Nations’ members—are parties to the Convention. See Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, UNITED NATIONS
TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&
mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).  The most notable
non-party to the Convention is the United States. See id. In addition, as of October 24,
2011, there are 79 signatories and 103 parties to the Optional Protocol, a supplement to
CEDAW designed to remedy some of the treaty’s shortcomings. See Optional Protocol to
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?
src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8-b&chapter=4&lang=EN (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).
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Here, I convert the term “unsex” into a methodology of sorts—a means
to attack the linkage between biological sex (“biosex”) and sex roles.7  In
this Article, I observe that “mothering” and “fathering” have been inappro-
priately tethered to biosex.  “Mothering” should be unsexed as the primary
parental relationship. “Fathering,” correspondingly, should be unsexed from
its breadwinner status.  In an ideal world, people now considered “mothers”
and “fathers” would be “parents” first, a category that includes all forms of
caretaking.  One could even imagine an androgynous world in which parent-
ing has no sexed subcategories, whether attached to biosex or not.  I doubt
our world is anywhere near that; I also wonder whether universal androgyny
is a utopian ideal worth pursuing.  I instead focus in this Article on unsexing
the roles of “mother” and “father,” elevating them from biodeterminist
brandings to chosen classifications or roles.  Removing biosex from “moth-
ering” and “fathering” may ultimately eliminate some of the meaning of
these terms, but its elimination is less important than undoing the biosex
link.  Liberated from biosex roles, a parent could define herself as “parent,”
“mother,” or “father” with some fluidity.
Although the term “unsexed” has not been widely used in this regard,
our legal architecture avows support for sex neutrality and equality.  As the
Supreme Court said in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, there
should be no “fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and
females” embodied in the application of the law.8  This ideal permeates civil
society: either sex should be allowed to perform every role in society.  As a
distributive matter, however, this remains an elusive goal.9
7 For example, the title of Berta E. Herna´ndez-Truyol’s response to my discussion in
Pregnant Man?  is “Unsexing Pregnancy.”  Symposium, Pregnant Man? A Conversa-
tion, 22 YALE L.J. FEMINISM 207 (2010) [hereinafter Symposium, Pregnant Man?].  I
want to note that I use the term “biosex” with some trepidation.  In no way do I seek to
reinforce the meaning or import of biological functions.  Although certain bodies have
certain capacities, “sex” is something that the law and social norms construct.  I wish I
had a more effective term for articulating the set of functions currently viewed as at-
tached to sex identity, but in the absence of such a term, I continue to use “biosex.”
Thanks to Dean Spade for this critical point.
8 458 U.S. 718, 724–25 (1982) (holding, in response to a male plaintiff claiming sex
discrimination, that the school’s female-only admissions policy violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Hogan stems from the line of sex discrimi-
nation cases marked prominently by Frontiero v. Richardson.  411 U.S. 677, 678–79
(1973) (holding that a policy that differentiated between benefits for spouses of females
and spouses of males in the uniformed services was unconstitutional sex-based
discrimination).
9 It is an elusive goal in particular for women.  Although much has changed, given
women’s relatively low numbers in political and corporate leadership positions, it is clear
that women are still viewed as somehow unfit for such endeavors. Cf. Bradwell v. Illi-
nois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) (“The natural and proper timidity
and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupa-
tions of civil life.”).
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The mantra of sex neutrality10 and equality of opportunity belies social
and legal default rules that entrap us in a sexed existence.11  Parenting is
especially rife with defaults that distinguish persons legally deemed as
“mothers” from “fathers.”  Socioeconomic conventions reflexively reduce
parenting to a woman’s job, without compensation, while men are presumed
incapable or uninterested in performing these duties.  Institutions support the
sexed status quo through their insistence on liberal norms without a more
active pursuit of the unsexed ideal.
In Pregnant Man?: A Conversation, I described my own experience as
a differently sexed mother/parent and the impact of my gender on parent-
ing.12  Here, I promote a conception of parenting that embraces the fluidity
of contemporary understandings of gender and the need for balancing roles
within the family.  Part I elaborates the ways in which legal and social norms
configure parenting as a sexed endeavor.  Part II argues that the solution to
this problem is to unsex mothering, fathering, and parenting.  Unwinding
parenting from biosex roles creates a construction of family that is liberating
for traditionally sexed women and men and  holds potential for the equality
of LGBT parents.  Women’s economic equality efforts have tended to fail in
part because of childcare; accordingly, their economic success largely de-
10 See generally Martha Fineman, The Neutered Mother, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 653
(1992) [hereinafter Fineman, The Neutered Mother] (ardently criticizing liberal legal
feminism’s insistence on sex neutrality).  “Unsex” has a very different meaning from
“neutered,” which Fineman criticizes.  Fineman argues:
In their increasingly important role of effecting changes in law and legal institu-
tions, liberal legal feminists have represented women’s issues and concerns as
though they are due in part to pathology in the traditional institution of mother-
hood.  The result is that their rhetoric surrounding issues of potential law reform
constantly reaffirms the notion that Mother must be overcome—refashioned so
that the individual woman is left unencumbered.  To a great extent the law and
legal language have begun to incorporate the liberal legal feminist notion that
Mother is an institution which must be reformed—that is, contained and neutral-
ized.  In law, this has been accomplished through the transfiguration of the sym-
bolically positive cultural and social components of parenting typically associated
with the institution of motherhood into the degendered components of the
neutered institution of “parenthood.”
Id. at 655; see also infra Part I.B.
11 My understanding of legal default rules comes from Elizabeth Emens’ authoritative
work in this area.  Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and
the Future of Marital Names, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 827–28 (2007).  In addressing
default rules for marital names, she states:
Majoritarian default rules (for example, Keeping for men) generally reduce trans-
action costs for private parties by supplying a default that tracks what most people
would want.  Minoritarian, and particularly penalty, default rules (for example,
Keeping for women) force parties to convey information—to reveal their prefer-
ences—to each other and to third parties such as courts.
Social defaults, as opposed to the legal default rules that Emens discusses, may not oper-
ate with the force of law but function in coercive ways nonetheless.  Whether through
social stigma or financial pressure, social defaults shape parents’ decision-making.
12 See Rosenblum, Pregnant Man?, supra note 1, at 209–17. R
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pends on shifting men into family responsibilities.  Part III shifts the frame
to international and comparative law.  International law fosters a sexed vi-
sion of parenting but also suggests ways to shift toward an unsexed future.
After examining the international framework for parenting roles, Part III ex-
amines one public policy example of unsexed parenting, parental leave, us-
ing a comparative law analysis contrasting the U.S. Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA) with Sweden’s Parental Leave Act.  Parental leave is the
perfect position from which to examine unsexing because it sits in the mid-
dle of the triad of corporate law, family law, and public law.  In that sense, it
evokes the challenges of intermediating among the normative and regulatory
forces of these three legal frames.  The Conclusion asserts that parenting is
becoming more unsexed and that legal regimes governing parenting should
encourage this development to promote fluidity in parenting roles.
I. SEXED WORLD
Parenting is divided into “mothering” and “fathering,” categories as-
signed based on biosex presumptions.  Although these roles have different
forms in different cultures, societies and the laws that govern them divide
parents into “mothers” or “fathers.”13  The law constructs meanings around
physical capacities that some people possess and converts these meanings
into dichotomized “sexes.”  Sex, in this sense, is constructed.  The biology
underlying sex construction is itself very much contested, as many functions
can be altered and are not universally shared among members of a particular
“sex.”  Although the proponents of sexed legal and social regimes seek to
maintain this sexedness, fissures and cracks in sexedness have begun to sur-
face.  First, I clarify what I mean by sexed mothering and fathering: mother-
ing and fathering are sexed when mothers and fathers assume roles that have
been essentialized into biosex difference.  Second, I focus on the biological
characteristics that lead to the construction of women as mothers.  Third, I
attempt to pull apart the links among biology, fathering, and men’s economic
role.  This phenomenon partially persists because of the interaction between
two non-state, private entities—the market and the family.14  Women’s asso-
ciation with the family sector is matched by men’s link to the economic.15
Moves to refocus women on economic self-sufficiency have succeeded only
to a limited extent, leaving the sex dichotomy as the predominant organizing
structure in both market and family. I close this Part by raising the extent to
which social and legal structures foster this “sexedness.”
13 This is true even in societies that recognize more than two sexes. See infra note
22. R
14 See Darren Rosenblum, Feminizing Capital: A Corporate Imperative, 6 BERKELEY
BUS. L.J. 55, 68–73 (2009) [hereinafter Rosenblum, Feminizing Capital].
15 See Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in International Law, 93 AM. J. INT’L
L. 379, 383 (1999) (noting that in all societies “women are associated with the private
sphere of the home and family”).
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A. Defining “Sexed” Parenting—A Sexed World
A sexed understanding of parents depends on both a dichotomized un-
derstanding of humanity and a very particular religious, psychoanalytic, and
aesthetic framework.  Behind the understanding of sexed parenting sits
sexed humanity.  Despite the viral gender bending of Lady Gaga’s “little
monsters,”16 sex, whether biosex or social sex,17 is still constructed as a cate-
gory with two choices: “either of the two divisions, designated female and
male . . . .”18  Yet, much of contemporary science rejects this rigid dichot-
omy in favor of recognizing the multiplicity of sexes composed of a variety
of traits.19  In addition, sex and gender vary across cultural and national
boundaries.20  “Mother” and “father” are also culturally contingent, and
shift in tandem with “sex” and “gender.”21
Although sexedness exists along a biological continuum composed of
permanent and non-permanent biological, cultural, and psychological mark-
ers, some thinkers still accept the male-female binarism as “natural” and
16 Lady Gaga has become a pop culture phenomenon over the past few years.  She
views her work as akin to that of a performance artist engaged in deconstructing fame
and gender.  She regularly brings crossdressing into her imagery and language.  For ex-
ample, the refrain of her 2011 song “Born This Way” is “Don’t be a drag, just be a
queen.” LADY GAGA, BORN THIS WAY (Interscope Records 2011).  She has posed on the
front cover of Vogue Hommes Japan as Jo Calderone, her “male alter ego.”  Jocelyn
Vena, Lady Gaga Poses as Her Male Alter Ego, MTV (Aug. 25, 2010, 1:42 PM), http://
www.mtv.com/news/articles/1646460/lady-gaga-poses-her-male-alter-ego.jhtml.  “Little
monsters” is the term used by Lady Gaga for her fans.  Nicole Carter, Lady Gaga Dedi-
cates Her New ‘Little Monsters’ Tattoo to Her Fans, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 3, 2010,
http://www.nydailynews.com/gossip/2010/02/03/2010-02-03_lady_gaga_dedicates_her_
new_little_monsters_tattoo_to_her_fans.html.
17 By social sex, I mean roles that we self-assign.
18 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1595 (4th ed. 2006).
19 Most people accept the binarism despite the fact that these categories contain a
myriad of identities, formed genetically, biologically, and culturally.  As Judith Butler
argues: “The binary regulation of sexuality suppresses the subversive multiplicity of a
sexuality that disrupts heterosexual, reproductive, and medicojuridical hegemonies.”
JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE 26 (10th anniversary ed. 1999). Butler views “sex” as
providing “an artificial unity on an otherwise discontinuous set of attributes.” Id. at 146.
See also Anne Fausto-Sterling, The Five Sexes: Why Male and Female Are Not Enough,
THE SCIENCES, Mar.–Apr. 1993, at 21 (“[B]iologically speaking, there are many grada-
tions running from female to male . . . .  [O]ne can argue that along that spectrum lie at
least five sexes—and perhaps even more.”); Darren Rosenblum, “Trapped” in Sing Sing:
Transgendered Prisoners Caught in the Gender Binarism, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 499,
503–04 (2000) [hereinafter Rosenblum, Sing Sing] (arguing that sexedness exists on a
continuum influenced by variables such as chromosomes, genital and gonadal develop-
ment, reproductive capacities, secondary sexual characteristics, and self-identity); Sharon
E. Preves, Sexing the Intersexed: An Analysis of Sociocultural Responses to Intersexual-
ity, 27 SIGNS 523, 526 (2002) (discussing sexual identity as a “complex set of linear and
causal assumptions”).
20 Cf. Darren Rosenblum, Internalizing Gender, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 759,
801 (2007) [hereinafter Rosenblum, Internalizing Gender] (arguing that gender varies
substantially by country and is culturally-dependent).
21 Thank you to Holning Lau for this suggestion. See also Rosenblum, Internalizing
Gender, supra note 20, at 807–08. R
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“real.”22  Some religious and social authorities depict sharply sexed parent-
ing roles as distinct, complementary, and essential for a child’s well being.23
For them, heterosexual marriage reinforces sexed parenting: it is “anything
but free of ‘fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and
females,’ also anything but free of female subordination.”24
A wide range of intellectual and social forces, across the ideological
spectrum, has reinforced this binarism.  On the left, in France, drawing on
psychoanalytic theory, philosopher Sylviane Agacinski uses gender binarism
in parenting to argue against same-sex marriage.  Agacinski’s theory,
grounded in Lacanian psychoanalysis, draws on an understanding of the
“sexed condition of human existence” to argue that the presence of a man
and a woman is necessary for a child’s proper development because the two
sexes are so distinct.25  Agacinski’s vehement opposition to unsexing parent-
ing draws on prior feminist theory, notably that of Luce Irigaray.26
22 Thanks to Holning Lau for engaging with me on this important point.  This is not
to say that only two sexes exist in each and every culture: some societies have deep-
rooted traditions of recognizing a third sex.  As a historical matter, berdaches were recog-
nized as a third sex by indigenous peoples in North America. See SYLVAIN LAROCQUE,
GAY MARRIAGE: THE STORY OF A CANADIAN SOCIAL REVOLUTION 62–63 (Robert
Chodos, Louisa Blair & Benjamin Waterhouse trans., 2006). See also Terry S. Kogan,
Transsexuals and Critical Gender Theory: The Possibility of a Restroom Labeled
“Other”, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1223, 1242 (1997) (discussing berdaches in the context of
Native American culture).  Various Asian societies also recognize the legitimacy of other
sexes. See Sonia Katyal, Exporting Identity, 14 YALE J.L & FEMINISM 97, 137 (2002)
(noting that Thailand’s sexual identity system recognized three genders: male, female, and
kathoey).  In recent years, the supreme courts of Pakistan and Nepal have called for rec-
ognition of the hijras as a third sex. See Holning Lau, Grounding Conversations on
Sexuality and Asian Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 773, 780 (2011) (noting that in 2009,
the Pakistani Supreme Court held that intersex and transgender hijras have the right to be
recognized as a third sex by the government).
23 See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 999–1000 (Mass.
2003) (Cordy, J., dissenting):
[T]he Legislature could rationally conclude that a family environment with mar-
ried opposite-sex parents remains the optimal social structure in which to bear
children and that the raising of children by same-sex couples, who by definition
. . . cannot provide children with a parental authority figure of each gender,
presents an alternative structure for child rearing that has not yet proved itself . . .
to be as optimal as the biologically based marriage norm.
24 Mary Anne Case, What Feminists Have to Lose in Same-Sex Marriage Litigation,
57 UCLA L. REV. 1199, 1202 (2010) [hereinafter Case, Same-Sex Marriage Litigation]
(quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982)).
25 Sylviane Agacinski, L’homoparentalite´ en question, LE MONDE, June 6, 2007,
http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2007/06/21/l-homoparentalite-en-question-par-sylvi-
ane-agacinski_926550_3232.html.  The challenging theoretical nature of Agacinski’s
work has led to commentary that seeks merely to elucidate the bases for her claims. See,
e.g., Gilles Bon-Maury, Homoparentalite´: l’Ignorance ne Peut Conduire qu’a` la Vio-
lence, HOMOSEXUALITE´S ET SOCIALISME, (July 9, 2007), http://www.hes-france.org/ac-
tions/homoparentalite-l-ignorance-ne (discussing Agacinski’s concept of
“homoparentalite´”).
26 See LUCE IRIGARAY, THIS SEX WHICH IS NOT ONE (Catherine Porter trans., Cornell
Univ. Pres 1985).  Irigaray argues that men, whose biology involves one sex organ, a
penis, are unitary; women, by contrast, have multiple genitalia. See id. at 26–28.  This
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Regardless of whether academics draw on psychoanalytic or feminist
theory, their belief in the metaphysics of two opposed sexes matches that of
Western society’s most conservative institutions.  On the right, at least with
regard to sexual mores, the Catholic Church rebukes the concept of “gender
ideology” and warns against theories that oppose the male/female binary as
a threat to the family and its “natural” two-parent structure of mother and
father.27  Within this structure, parenting appears largely as a woman’s job.
As Mary Anne Case carefully explores, the Vatican pronounced in the 1960s
a relatively progressive position regarding the role of men and women in the
family, a position from which it has sharply retreated, coming close to say-
ing that even souls have a sex.28  One prominent Vatican representative re-
cently asserted “the theory of gender is the most worrying sign of the current
ideas about man.”29  While espousing the theory that sex roles are distinct
and their blurring poses a direct harm to children raised in such homes, he
simultaneously believes that a “war of the sexes” cannot be reconciled with
Catholic thought.30
multiplicity sits at the origin of the difference between women’s language and men’s
language: while men reference themselves more than interlocutors and speak in subject/
object constructions, women incessantly reference the party to whom they speak and
reframe the subject/object relationship constantly. See Darren Rosenblum, Parity/Dis-
parity: Electoral Gender Inequality on the Tightrope of Liberal Constitutional Traditions,
39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1119, 1161 (2006) [hereinafter Rosenblum, Parity/Disparity]
(discussing Irigaray’s understanding of male and female sexuality).
27 Vatican consultant warns African Church leaders on ‘gender ideology’, CATHOLIC
CULTURE (Aug. 11, 2010), http://www.catholicculture.org/news/headlines/index.cfm?
storyid=7179 [hereinafter Vatican consultant warns African Church leaders on ‘gender
ideology’] ; see also Joseph Card. Ratzinger, Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church
on the Collaboration of Men and Women in The Church and in the World, http://www.
vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20040731_
collaboration_en.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2011):
The obscuring of the difference or duality of the sexes has enormous conse-
quences on a variety of levels.  This theory of the human person, intended to
promote prospects for equality of women through liberation from biological deter-
minism, has in reality inspired ideologies which, for example, call into question
the family, in its natural two-parent structure of mother and father, and make
homosexuality and heterosexuality virtually equivalent, in a new model of poly-
morphous sexuality.
Id.
28 Mary Anne Case, No Male or Female 2 (Chicago Pub. Law & Legal Theory,
Working Paper No. 266, 2009) (discussing the evolution of the Church’s understanding of
sex difference and sex equality).
29 Vatican consultant warns African Church leaders on ‘gender ideology’, supra note
27. R
30 See id. The Catholic Church’s war on gender can also be seen in its reaction to
same-sex marriage.  As Janet Halley has explored: “[Joseph Cardinal] Ratzinger argues
that Catholics must actively resist any public policy of recognizing purported marriages
between homosexuals. . . . [H]e represents marriage as a firmly formal, absolute legal
condition, steeply different from its alternatives, with fixed moral attributes that define it
and from which individual marriages must not deviate.”  Janet Halley, Behind the Law of
Marriage (I): From Status/Contract to the Marriage System, 6 HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 1, 6
(2010).  When the Church defends “the specific heterosexuality of marriage as a sacred
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLG\35-1\HLG102.txt unknown Seq: 10 12-JAN-12 9:50
66 Harvard Journal of Law & Gender [Vol. 35
Beyond the realms of academic theory and religion, social and legal
default rules force biosex roles on parents, turning them into “mothers” and
“fathers.”   For instance, the categories “male” and “female” fluidly trans-
late to “father” and “mother” in parenting.  Popular culture embraces these
distinctions: while parents in contemporary television are no longer Ward
and June Cleaver of Leave It to Beaver, the gulf between Modern Family’s
Phil and Claire Dunphy remains substantial.31  Social science literature also
testifies to the extent to which mothers and fathers see themselves and each
other differently.32
The market is also sexed: the perception that “mothers” are primarily
responsible for children persists in part because of the continued domination
of men in the market context.33  Created by the state and functioning outside
its authority, the market reinforces cultural biosex stereotypes.34  Women’s
second-class status at work is coterminous with their principal responsibility
nexus between the human and the divine,” id. (emphasis in original), it implicitly en-
dorses the traditional, gendered notions of the heterosexual couple.
31 Ward and June Cleaver epitomize a 1950s heteronormative view of the American
family.  By comparison, Modern Family, as its title suggests, depicts a structure distinct
from the traditional view on American lifestyles.  Whereas June Cleaver was the stere-
otypical housewife subservient to her working husband, Ward, Claire Dunphy is an inde-
pendent woman with power over the family structure.  Nonetheless, Phil is depicted as
the bumbling and aloof working father, while Claire is the anal and overreactive mother,
a prototype for Naomi Mezey’s new maternalism.  On this new maternalism, see infra
notes 58–64 and accompanying text. R
32 Catherine Kenney and Ryan Bogle of Bowling Green State University used data
from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study to examine the effect of maternal
gatekeeping on father involvement in opposite-sex families. CATHERINE KENNEY &
RYAN BOGLE, MOTHERS’ GATE-KEEPING OF FATHER INVOLVEMENT IN MARRIED- AND
COHABITATING-COUPLE FAMILIES (2009), available at http://paa2009.princeton.edu/
download.aspx?submissionId=91717.  The study examined 1563 couples in the United
States and concluded that mothers were protective of caregiving and educational activi-
ties because they were important to the women’s identity as caregivers. Id. at 8, 16. They
conclude “that married mothers’ gatekeeping—and their gender role attitudes more gen-
erally—ha[d] a strong negative association with the proportion of parental time in activi-
ties that [wa]s spent by fathers.” Id. at 16. See also Sharon Jayson, More Parents Share
the Workload But First, Mothers have to Learn to Let Go, USA TODAY, May 5, 2009, at
1D (dicussing women’s unwillingness to share the responsibilities of primary caregiving
with men).
33 See Stephanie Coontz, Myth of the Opt-Out Mom, in RACE, CLASS, AND GENDER IN
THE UNITED STATES: AN INTEGRATED STUDY 473, 474 (Paula S. Rothenberg ed., 7th ed.
2006) (“Mothers have always been less likely to work full-time than men or childless
women.”); see also Rosenblum, Feminizing Capital, supra note 14, at 56 (discussing R
efforts to promote women’s equal participation in the workforce).  Sixty-seven percent of
senior-level women working within Fortune 1000 companies surveyed responded that “a
commitment to personal or family responsibilities [is] a barrier to women’s advance-
ment.” CATALYST, WOMEN AND MEN IN U.S. CORPORATE LEADERSHIP 25 (2004),
available at http://www.catalyst.org/file/74/women%20and%20men%20in%20u.s.%20
corporate%20leadership%20same%20workplace,%20different%20realities.pdf.  Further-
more, only 14 percent of women surveyed believed that they would be able to use paren-
tal leave without putting their career track in jeopardy. Id. at 31.
34 See, e.g., Frances E. Olsen, International Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/
Private Distinction, in RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 157,
157–59 (Dorinda G. Dallmeyer ed., 1993) (noting that the public/private distinction is
sexed, with women being associated with the private sphere of the home); see also Ro-
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for children.35  This split varies along constructions of race, culture, class,
and ethnicity—indeed motherhood and fatherhood differ along these axes.36
Women find themselves impoverished financially, but rich in familial re-
sponsibilities.  Men benefit enormously from their economic prowess, but
pay with a lack of family time, which leads to emotional isolation.37  The
following Subparts delineate how these family/market dichotomies relegate
people with vaginas to “motherhood” and people with penises to
“fatherhood.”
B. Disaggregating Mothering
In the 1937 film Stella Dallas, Barbara Stanwyck plays a divorced
working class woman who pretends to be irresponsible to convince her
daughter to choose to live with her patrician father.38  In the closing scene,
Stanwyck, standing outside in the rain, gazes in on her daughter’s perfect
upper class wedding, which she made happen through her selfless act of
giving up her daughter for the girl’s benefit.39   Such selflessness is not con-
fined to 1930s melodrama.  “Mother” still means “primary parent”—the
parent who performs the bulk of childcare, the parent who cares enough to
give up herself.40
senblum, Feminizing Capital, supra note 14, at 68–73 (discussing the sexed characteris- R
tics of the public/private distinction).
35 Carol Sanger played a crucial role in beginning the project of using legal analysis
to unpack the meaning of “mother.”  Carol Sanger, M is for the Many Things, 1 S. CAL.
REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 15 (1992).  Sanger states:
My basic argument is this: Motherhood is a central but confusing icon within our
social structure.  It is at once dominating and dominated, much as mothers are
both revered and regulated.  The reverence and regulation are not so much in
conflict as in league.  The rules remind women of how to behave in order to stay
revered. This reverence is something more than a fan club for mothers.  It matters
in such practical and concrete ways as keeping one’s children, having credibility
in court, getting promoted at work, and so on.
Id. at 17–18. See also Bridget J. Crawford, Third-Wave Feminism, Motherhood and the
Future of Legal Theory, in GENDER, LAW AND SEXUALITIES 227–28 (Jackie Jones et al.
eds., forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1095337 (elaborating on the meaning of “mother” in light of Third Wave feminist
legal theory).
36 See, e.g., Adrien Katherine Wing & Laura Weselmann, Transcending Traditional
Notions of Mothering: The Need for Critical Race Feminist Praxis, 3 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 257, 258–59 (1999) (arguing that the law regards the ideal mother as “self-sacrific-
ing, nurturing, married, white, solvent, stay-at-home, monogamous, heterosexual, [and]
female,” and arguing that the definition of mothers should be expanded to include “non-
traditional mothers—men, lesbians, poor women, and women of color”).
37 See generally JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY
MEN AND CLASS MATTER 79–83 (2010) (discussing how workplace practices disadvan-
tage men by keeping them out of the private sphere).
38 STELLA DALLAS (United Artists 1937).
39 Id.
40 Wing & Weselmann, supra note 36, at 258; see also Charity M. Brown, Women R
are More Likely than Men to Give up Sleep to Care for Children and Others, WASH.
POST, Feb. 14, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/14/
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This sacrifice of women is not solely relegated to culture, of course.  As
a matter of legal history, the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Bradwell v.
Illinois:
The constitution of the family organization, which is founded in
the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates
the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain
and functions of womanhood . . . The paramount destiny and mis-
sion of woman are to fulfil [sic] the noble and benign offices of
wife and mother.  This is the law of the Creator.41
The legacy of this sharp male/female dichotomy of public/private continues
to carry legal and social meaning.  Women’s primacy in the family allows
them to benefit from presumptions that they are the “primary parent,” but
also serves to subject them to blame for family problems.  Art provides a
colorful example in “Maman,” a work by the unique Louise Bourgeois.42
“Maman,” mother in French, is a nine-meter high sculpture of a spider done
in the 1990s that strikes an undeniably frightening posture.43  The Maman
will weave and eat her prey in order to continue to mother.44
1. Biology’s Outsized Role
Biology plays a central role in the construction of individuals as
“mothers” and “fathers.”  Regardless of whether one becomes a parent
through ordinary heterosexual copulation between fertile individuals or
through surrogacy or adoption, biological processes create children.  The
fact that many women experience pregnancy and lactation serves to define
“motherhood” for many.45  Websites, books, and classes advise “moms” on
how to improve their ability to perform these functions.46  Perceptions of
biological functions smooth the path for women to become “primary par-
ent” mothers.  Women who carry their own babies build a relationship with
the baby in utero.  Breastfeeding can continue this attachment.  Newborns
need to be fed during the night to promote health and comfort, which can
AR2011021405833.html (“Women are 2 1/2 times as likely to interrupt their sleep to care
for others”); JUDITH WORELL, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WOMEN AND GENDER 807 (2001)
(“[M]others much more than fathers are primary caregivers within the family and have
primary responsibility for household work.”).
41 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872).
42 See Press Release, Tate, Tate Acquires Louise Bourgeois’s giant spider, Maman
(Jan. 11, 2008), available at http://www.tate.org.uk/about/pressoffice/pressreleases/2008/
13904.htm.  Bourgeois has said that the sculpture is “an ode to my mother.” Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 I should note though that while lactation cannot be “unsexed,” the feeding of
breast milk can and has been unsexed through breast pump technology.  It is even com-
monplace to use breast milk that is frozen and shipped or stored in milk banks.
46 See, e.g., PREGNANCYWEEKLY, PARENTING WEEKLY, http://pregnancy-blog.parent-
ingweekly.com/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2011) (an online blog about pregnancy and parent-
ing, featuring the tagline “for your most important forty weeks”).
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give a breastfeeding mother more experience in putting the child to sleep
and thus make the child feel closer to her.47  Women’s mastery of these cru-
cial life experiences for the baby cements their centrality as “mothers.”
To prove that mothering is a social and not a biological phenomenon,
let us examine the various elements of women’s physiognomy that make
them “mothers.”  Three elements—ovulation, gestation/birth, and lacta-
tion—are the core biological elements of women’s parenting role, each of
which I argue lacks a necessary connection to mothering.
Women ovulate, and the egg not only transmits genetic material, but
also provides the conditions to host sperm for fertilization.  The egg is life,
both symbolically and literally, and yet a woman without ovaries or who
produces no eggs may still be a mother both as a matter of custom and of
law.  For example, if a woman has a child through a surrogate and, after its
birth, raises the child and acts as its mother, people in general will consider
her to be the child’s mother.  That is, both the legal and social understanding
of “mother” does not include ovulation as a necessary criterion.  Although
only an ovary-bearing person may create an egg, that function and mother-
hood have no necessary link.  Indeed, with the increasing prevalence of in
vitro fertilization, as well as extensive markets in which women provide
their eggs, people of all sexes may obtain eggs and have them fertilized for
reproduction.48
Although the increasing prevalence in egg markets is fairly well estab-
lished, at least in many parts of the United States, the connection between
gestation and motherhood remains central under the law.  A woman who
carries and gives birth to a child is presumed to be that child’s legal mother.
Moreover, gestation, according to contemporary science, plays a critical
formative role in the creation of a child, a role that in some ways rivals the
genetic influence of the egg and the sperm.49  Colloquial expressions frame
women who carry a child for another as “mothers” of a sort—“surrogate
mothers” in English, “meres porteuses” in French.  Some surrogate mothers
may even consider themselves temporary “babysitters” who hold some cru-
cial, but not motherly, role in the life of the baby. However, the general
47 See, e.g., Babies and Sleeping, BBC HEALTH, http://www.bbc.co.uk/health/physi-
cal_health/child_development/babies_sleeping.shtml (last visited Nov. 4, 2011).
48 Nicholas Bakalar, In Vitro Fertilization, 1974, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2011, http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/03/22/health/22first.html?_r=2 (noting that in-vitro fertilization,
a new technology in the late 1970s, has now resulted in four million living in vitro
babies).
49 See, e.g., AM. ACAD. OF CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY, FACTS FOR FAMILIES:
DRINKING ALCOHOL IN PREGNANCY (FETAL ALCOHOL EFFECTS) 1 (2006), available at
http://www.aacap.org/galleries/FactsForFamilies/93_drinking_alcohol_in_pregnancy_fe-
tal_alcohol_effects.pdf (discussing the negative effects of alcohol consumption on fetal
development); Gestational Diabetes and its Long Term Effects on Mothers and Their
Children, CLINICAL LAB. INT’L, http://www.cli-online.com/featured-articles/gestational-
diabetes-and-its-long-term-effects-on-mothers-and-their-children/index.html (last visited
Oct. 23, 2011) (discussing a condition known as “gestational diabetes” and its potential
effects on the developing fetus).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLG\35-1\HLG102.txt unknown Seq: 14 12-JAN-12 9:50
70 Harvard Journal of Law & Gender [Vol. 35
social understanding of “mother” does not include surrogate mothers; peo-
ple in general will consider the woman who provides primary caretaking for
the child to be its “mother.”50  Therefore, a woman can be a “mother” with-
out actually carrying a child, and a woman who carries a child need not
necessarily be viewed as a mother.
The same argument applies to lactation, though this is the subject of
much controversy.51  Although only people with mammary glands can pro-
duce milk, many women, and indeed many mothers, cannot do so or choose
not to do so.  As with eggs and gestation, human milk is traded for monetary
or nonmonetary reasons.  Indeed, until nearly the early twentieth century,
women of means hired wet nurses to breastfeed their children.52  The act of
feeding an infant itself creates intimacy regardless of the milk’s source.
Therefore, it is not obvious that engaging in lactation makes a woman any
more or less of a mother.  Indeed, much as in the case of ovulation and
gestation, people in general would consider a woman who did not breastfeed
a child but raised the child and acted as its primary caretaker to be its
“mother.”
The various ways in which one can become a mother complicate the
usage of the term in ways that expose language’s inadequacy.  A child born
of gestational surrogacy, under traditional terms, has three people who may
be considered mothers: a “genetic mother” (“sm1”), a “surrogate mother”
(“sm2”), and a “legal mother” (“sm3”) (if one of the parties contracting for
surrogacy is female).  Note that there will be still more mothers if the surro-
gacy involves lesbians.  If a lesbian couple uses another woman’s egg/em-
bryo but one of them carries the child, there will be an sm1, but the sm2 is
also the sm3.  Similarly, an adopted child (if one of the adopting people is
female) has two mothers: a “birth mother” (“am1”) and an “adoptive
mother” (“am2”).
The social role of the am2 most clearly makes my point: as a legal
matter, am2 is the “real” mother—she has the right to parental leave; as a
social matter, to view the adoptive mother as anything other than the mother
50 Note, however, that the social understanding of “mother” is somewhat ambivalent
on this point.  Babysitters, for example, are, for all intents and purposes, primary caretak-
ers for the duration of the babysitting.  However, as I have argued above, caretaking is
typically the defining characteristic of motherhood.  Therefore, with respect to babysit-
ters, society tends to emphasize the biological relationship (which woman gave birth to
the child) rather than the caretaking relationship (which woman takes care of the child)
when it identifies the “mother.”  Whether a babysitter can “mother” the child is a ques-
tion that raises fascinating and sometimes ugly class and race questions that other schol-
ars have elegantly explored. See, e.g.,  LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN
104–10 (2006) (noting the challenges minority immigrants face as domestic care
workers).
51 The La Leche League is but one of many organizations that have made the promo-
tion of breastfeeding a central purpose. See LA LECHE LEAGUE INTERNATIONAL, http://
www.llli.org/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).
52 Jeninine Lee-St. John, Outsourcing Breast Milk, TIME, Apr. 19, 2007, http://
www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1612710,00.html.
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is disrespectful.  We do not think of am2 as less of a mother because she has
neither birthed nor breastfed the child.  Am2’s mothering arises from the
relationship with the child, and not from a genetic connection.  Likewise, we
do not think of the am1 or the sm1 or sm2 as the mother because all three
individuals chose not to raise the child.
This taxonomical endeavor is a superficial one—it would be fascinating
to pursue it in depth, but my principal point draws on the presence of multi-
ple mothers.  As people typically understand the term, the “mother” is the
person who does the “mothering”—diaper-changing and night feedings
matter more than gestation, lactation, or the presence of genetic material.  In
the context of adoption and surrogacy, biology is at the very least
subordinate, if not irrelevant.  In this sense, one might say that a pregnant
person only becomes a mother if she cares for the child born of her womb
(am1 or sm2) or of her genes (sm1).  Ovulation, gestation, birth, and lacta-
tion matter, of course.  However, just as their absence does not deprive
someone of the status of “mother,” their presence does not make someone a
mother. Unsexing motherhood will bring the legal and social rules in line
with this understanding of “mother.”
2. Mama Grizzlies: Women as Dominant Primary Parent
Although U.S. law has begun to shift away from a sexed vision of
parenting, and the economy continues its slow shift toward greater balance
between men and women, social norms of parenting, and, in particular,
mothering, continue to assert the primacy of the mother within the family
unit.  Indeed, with overtones of women’s empowerment (but few of femi-
nism’s gender politics), mothers have become increasingly engaged in
“supermom” discourses about women who can both serve as a primary par-
ent and as a presence in the public sphere.
The element of choice complicates these factors considerably.  To the
extent legal norms favor women’s departure from traditional roles, some wo-
men have responded with an “opt-out” revolution, in which well-educated
women abandon their career paths in favor of becoming stay-at-home
mothers.53  These opt-out mothers should have the right to do so, but the
numbers of highly educated women who make this choice can only slow a
53 See LINDA R. HIRSHMAN, GET TO WORK: A MANIFESTO FOR WOMEN OF THE
WORLD 1–3 (2006).  Indeed, the debates over the Declaration on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women (“DEDAW”) reflect this dilemma early in the
debates over women in international law.  As the United States’ representative stated:
However, that child-bearing role could in no case justify a large complex of dis-
tinctions between the rights accorded to men and those accorded to women.  Wo-
men must be given the right, which had always been recognized for men, to
choose freely their life-task and the pattern of life which suited them.  Once that
choice had been made, they must be given the right to participate as fully as men
in the kind of life chosen.  It had been found by experience that, when they were
given a choice, many women chose freely the traditional role of wife and mother.
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shift toward women’s equality in the workplace.54  In a society where the
upper echelons of political and corporate power still exclude extremely well-
educated and talented women, mothering is one of the only socially-ap-
proved contexts in which women can exercise dominance.  Indeed, as Kathe-
rine Franke has noted, women who resist mothering are actually seen as
unnatural: “Reproduction has been so taken for granted that only women
who are not parents are regarded as having made a choice—a choice that is
constructed as nontraditional, nonconventional, and for some, non-
natural.”55
Socioeconomic and legal settings might minimize biology, but with the
social construction of mothering it becomes destiny.  Not only must women
who parent be “mothers,” but social norms demand an all-encompassing
engagement with this motherhood.  There is no room here for a woman to
style herself as the Baroness in The Sound of Music, who confronts the pos-
sibility of raising all those children with the quip: “Darling, haven’t you ever
heard of a delightful little thing called boarding school?”56  Women cannot
juggle family and work in a way that favors the former, as Anna Wintour’s
avatar does in The Devil Wears Prada.57
Naomi Mezey and Cornelia Nina Pillard have identified a “new
maternalism” that reflects a growing disconnect between U.S. legal and cul-
tural views on motherhood and parenting.58  On the one hand, an intimate
resurgence of maternalism, seen on popular blogs like MomsRising.org and
through Sarah Palin’s “Grizzly Mama” rally cry,59 de-emphasizes the egali-
tarian notion that men can and should play a nurturing role in parenting.
Parenting, in this movement, is squarely within the women’s sphere.  On the
one hand, Mezey and Pillard argue, the past few decades have seen the
spread of sex-neutral laws regarding adoption, alimony, child custody, pa-
rental leave, and spousal benefits.60  Law, they argue, no longer assumes
motherhood for women and traditional family roles need not have an as-
signed gender.61  However, in the face of this legal trend, the “new maternal-
However, with free choice they accepted that role willingly, without any sense of
having been required to accept an inferior position.
U.N. GAOR, 22d Sess., 1471st mtg. at 36, U.N. doc. A/C.3/SR.1471 (Oct. 4, 1967).
54 See Louise Story, Many Women at Elite Colleges Set Career Path to Motherhood,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/20/national/20women.
html?_r=1&pagewanted=print.
55 Katherine Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law and Desire, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 181, 185 (2001).
56 THE SOUND OF MUSIC (20th Century Fox 1965).
57 THE DEVIL WEARS PRADA (20th Century Fox 2006).
58 Naomi Mezey & Cornelia Pillard, Against the New Mechanism, MICH. J. GENDER
& L. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 2–6), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1809912.
59 See id. at 16–17.
60 Id. at 2.
61 Id.  Although it is true that law no longer assumes motherhood for women, I em-
phasize the explicit and default rules (both legal and social) that continue to favor assign-
ment of parental roles based on sex.
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ism” undercuts these sex-neutral laws with its implicit return to women as
superior parents and caretakers.62  This “Mama Grizzly” maternalism63 un-
dermines men’s nurturing parental role. The fact that it is women who
choose this maternalism purports to empty the category of oppressive mean-
ing, when in reality it only serves to reinforce sexist economic structures.64
From the perspective of individual women, to relinquish this family primacy
for economic potential may seem like folly, but at a societal level it is essen-
tial for the realization of equality norms.
C. Fathers and Markets; Mothers and Homes
The sex binary has social and economic effects on men and women that
create “father” and “mother” roles.  While women become “mothers,” enti-
tling them to both the presumption of legitimate parenthood and the burden
of bearing principal responsibility for childcare, men function in the family
realm with less legitimacy and commensurately lower burdens, in large part
thanks to their economic primacy.  This Subpart will first examine the dis-
tinct biological role played by men in parenting. Then it will focus on men’s
economic role as “fathers” and men’s resulting legal role as “fathers.”
1. Biological Fathers
Before addressing the legal and economic framing of fatherhood as
male, it is worth noting the way in which male biological participation in
parenting differs from that of women.  Men provide sperm for the fertiliza-
tion of eggs—this is their only biological role, in contrast to the multiple
biological roles played by women (ovulation, gestation, birth, and lactation).
If women who do not carry a child or who do not lactate may be mothers,
why not a man?  A man can be a “mother” in the same way that an adoptive
mother can be.
The impact of this function differs sharply from the strictly biological
function of women.  A child born of gestational surrogacy has only one fa-
ther (if the parties contracting for surrogacy are heterosexual) or one genetic
father (“sf1”) and one adoptive father (“sf2”) if the couple is homosexual.
This contrasts with the presence of one or two potential “mothers” whose
role is solely biological.
In adoption, a child may have two or three fathers (if one or both of the
adopting people is male), but only one is the genetic father (“af1”)—the
other one or two fathers are legally indistinct (“af2”).
62 Id. at 3.
63 See id. at 16–17.
64 See Mezey & Pillard, supra note 58, at 57 (concluding that the “new maternalism” R
ignores fathers, male partners, relatives, and paid caregivers, whose inclusion would not
only ease the burden on mothers but also “transform the lives of children and the men
who care for them”).
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Even where reproduction results from the purported copulation of the
heterosexual parents, there may be two fathers.  If, after heterosexual copu-
lation, the father is actually someone other than the presumed father, there
will be a genetic father (“cf1”) and a legal father (“cf2”). The law does not
inquire whether the presumed father is the actual father unless prompted,65
which creates the possibility that men may parent as functional fathers even
when the genetic connection is lacking.  In this context, the male may con-
sider himself to be a cf1 when in fact he is a cf2; or his status as a cf2 may
be known to the parents but kept as a closely guarded secret.  Regardless, the
law does not care—for children born of heterosexual copulation, it seeks to
establish paternity regardless of whether this paternity is accurate.66
2. Economic Fathers
The singular biological role men play in parenting facilitates their dom-
inant economic role.  Because men’s biological parenting role is limited to
providing sperm, men historically have been able to outsource parenting re-
sponsibilities to women.  With the benefit of this subsidy, men are far more
attractive workers for corporate leaders.  Men appear more devoted to their
work, as women appear to lack the professional ambitions of their male
peers.67  Firms presume either that mothers taking parental leave will cost the
firm since other workers must fill in for lost labor, or that mothering will
lead to quitting.68  As a result, men dominate the economic sector in the
same way that women are central to the family.  Men still outpace women in
leadership roles and salary in the private sector,69 even though women
65 For example, children born to parents in a heterosexual marriage are presumed to
be the biological child of those parents. See Diane S. Kaplan, Why Truth is Not a Defense
in Paternity Actions, 10 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 69, 70 (2000).  In some instances, even if a
man can rebut a presumption of paternity against him, the court will not entertain evi-
dence on the ground of paternity by estoppel. See id. at 73.
66 See id.
67 Shelley J. Correll, Stephen Benard & In Paik, Getting a Job: Is There a Mother-
hood Penalty?, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1297, 1305–10, 1316 (2007).  In the authors’ study,
volunteers were presented with a pair of equally qualified, same-gendered, same-race
applicants only differing on parental status and asked to fill out surveys related to the
applicants. Id. at 1310–11.  The results indicated that mothers were judged as “signifi-
cantly less competent and committed than women without children.” Id. at 1316.  The
authors suggest that employers perceive mothers as being less committed to work and use
that perception to estimate their future effort. Id. at 1306.
68 See id. at 1306.
69 Rajneesh Sharma & Susan Givens-Skeaton, Ranking the Top 100 Firms According
to Gender Diversity, 30 ADVANCING WOMEN IN LEADERSHIP J. 1, 12 (2010), available at
http://www.advancingwomen.com/awl/2010/RajnesshSharma_SusanGivens-Skeaton.pdf.
Sharma and Givens-Skeaton analyzed the gender of the officers of the top hundred
United States corporations based on revenues and concluded that woman are “grossly
underrepresented at the top levels of management among the top 100 firms.” Id.  While
women are 46 percent of the workforce, they hold only 13 percent of the top management
positions in these firms. Fifty-seven of these one hundred firms have only one or no
female officers. Id. See also Rosenblum, Feminizing Capital, supra note 14, at 56. R
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briefly surpassed men in the working population during the current eco-
nomic crisis.70 Efforts to support women’s role in the economy sometimes
fail because incentives are not matched by a parallel inclusion of men in
family responsibilities.71
Market forces create social defaults that position men as “fathers”—
providers for their families, but not primarily responsible for childcare.  Be-
cause men’s economic role is so predominant, this market reality fosters a
presumption that men have a lower caregiving burden to prove their
parenthood than women.  With less effort, men’s actions appear more so-
cially laudable.  Expectations for men’s caretaking are so low that even occa-
sional diaper-changing or late-night feedings are applauded, despite such
efforts falling far short of equally sharing parental responsibilities.  “Father”
has come to mean at best, wage-earner, and at worst, absentee.72  Male par-
ents in heterosexual two-parent households typically occupy the secondary
parent role;73 as women are “mothers” and thus “primary parents,” men are
secondary.74
70 Floyd Norris, In This Recession, Men Are Losing Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/14/business/economy/14charts.html?_r=3.
71 See infra Part III.B. (discussing the United States Family and Medical Leave Act).
72 Indeed, the historical relation of a man to his family is one of dominion akin to
property. See Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1765
(2004–05).  The widespread continued use of men’s surnames marks the persistence of
this rapport, even if in a much less objectionable form. See Emens, supra note 11, at 771 R
(“[W]omen plainly adopted their husbands’ names by custom and not by legal
mandate.”).
73 The men’s movement mistakenly approaches family law questions as a matter of
individual rights.  As Martha Fineman writes:
The rhetoric of fathers’ rights and fathers’ responsibilities reflects the tendency to
reduce family policy to mere discussions of individual rights.  Three strains of
fathers’ rights rhetoric appear in contemporary discussions about mothers, chil-
dren, and families.  A perceived loss of paternal power or privilege is the focus of
both the middle class and the emerging African-American fathers’ rights dis-
courses.  Much less vocal (and visible) are the men who call for a transformation
of the whole notion of “father,” moving toward a redefinition that is neither hier-
archical nor patriarchal.  Unfortunately, most prevalent is the discourse in which
the primary concern seems to be a perceived and generalized loss of male privi-
lege: Many men no longer feel secure within the traditional family.
MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTI-
ETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 201–02 (1995) [hereinafter FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER,
THE SEXUAL FAMILY].
74 Some may argue that evolutionary biology provides a biological basis for this dis-
tinction, but other studies demonstrate the extent to which sex differences are a social
construction. See, e.g., Judith Lorber, “Night to His Day”: The Social Construction of
Gender, in THE  SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF  DIFFERENCE: RACE,  CLASS,  GENDER, AND
SEXUALITY 54, 54–57 (2010), available at www.csus.edu/indiv/s/shawg/courses/033/
readings/social_constructions.pdf. This debate itself, alongside the proliferation of fami-
lies departing from this sexed norm, gives new urgency to the inquiry into stereotype-
determined roles.
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3. Legal Fathers
These social defaults that make men “fathers” and women “mothers”
do not arise in a legal vacuum.  Men’s role as economic fathers permits them
to skirt caretaking requirements.  Yet, as a formal matter, the law has shifted
toward a sex-neutral position.75  Take, for example, the Supreme Court’s
holding in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs.76  Hibbs, a
man, filed suit claiming that his right to unpaid time off from work under the
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) had been violated.77  Surprisingly,
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in favor of Congress’s ability to legislate gen-
der equality: “the States’ record of unconstitutional participation in, and fos-
tering of, gender-based discrimination in the administration of leave benefits
is weighty enough to justify . . . legislation.”78  The former Chief Justice thus
firmly established the sex-neutrality of the law in the United States.
In the face of profound social norms around sex and parenting, thin
legal rules mandating sex neutrality may actually serve to reinforce social
defaults of difference.79  Such distinctions may go beyond stereotypes to
draw on biological differences between men and women.  The legal norms
fortify and even exaggerate such differentials.  For example, although it op-
erates in a limited context, the burden of proof for paternity and for mater-
nity differs.80  Men may be declared parents solely by establishing a genetic
linkage because courts are eager to assign fatherhood.81  The default rule for
“mother,” however, focuses on the woman who gave birth, which in the
case of surrogacy or adoption may not be the “real” mother.  For both
“mothers” and “fathers,” social parents may attain legal parental recogni-
tion.  If maternal rights are in doubt, a woman must demonstrate her rela-
tionship with the child in question.  Under the “de facto” parent test,
childcare—not breadwinning—suffices to establish maternal rights.82  For
75 See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 640, 653 (1975) (holding that
Social Security “mothers benefits” for widows must also be given to widowed fathers).
76 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
77 Id. at 725.
78 Id. at 735.
79 This is one of the many critiques of sex-neutral liberal legal feminism posited by
Martha Fineman and others. See, e.g., FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL
FAMILY, supra note 73, at 88–89 (“The law’s reluctance to recognize and accommodate R
the uniqueness of Mother’s role in child rearing conforms to the popular gender-neutral
fetish at the expense of considerations for Mother’s material and psychological
circumstances.”).
80 See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 59–60 (2001) (describing the statutory
requirements  for proving maternity and paternity when a child is born outside the United
States and only one of the parents is a U.S. citizen).
81 See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 516-a(b)(i) (McKinney 2011) (“The court shall
order genetic marker tests or DNA tests for the determination of the child’s paternity.”).
82 See A.H. v. M.P., 447 Mass. 828, 839 (2006).  To a limited extent, one can argue
that men continue to carry a lighter standard in demonstrating ties to a child.  The Ameri-
can Law Institute (ALI) Principles note that “[c]aretaking functions are the subset of
parenting functions that involve the direct delivery of day-to-day care and supervision to
the child.” AM. LAW INST. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS
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men, however, “holding oneself out” as the “father” carries substantial
weight in satisfying this burden.83  Until recently, this “holding out” stan-
dard applied only to men.  Thus, until recently a woman had to actually
nurture the child, while a man could simply announce that he was the fa-
ther.84  Legal rules regarding the rights and responsibilities of parents often
strive toward insistent neutrality, even in families where parents exercise
childcare to different degrees.85  This formal neutrality does not override the
background social and economic default rules that distinguish the responsi-
bilities for establishing women as “mothers” and men as “fathers.”
The immigration case Nguyen v. I.N.S. neatly reflects how the law’s
neutrality remains far from universal neutrality; some rules explicitly regu-
late fathers and mothers differently.  In that case, petitioner Tuan Ahn
Nguyen challenged the constitutionality of citizenship requirements for chil-
dren born to U.S. male citizens overseas.86  Under current federal law, chil-
dren born overseas out of wedlock to a U.S. mother and a noncitizen father
automatically acquire the nationality of the mother at birth.87  However, if
the child is born overseas out of wedlock to a U.S. citizen father and a
noncitizen mother, citizenship only extends to the child if there is evidence
of a “clear and convincing” blood relationship between father and child and
when the father agrees in writing to provide financial support until the age of
majority.88  A majority of the Supreme Court upheld the statute.  One of the
compelling government interests cited by Justice Kennedy was the interest in
“assuring that a biological parent-child relationship exists.”89  This case il-
lustrates the extent to which male parenthood is linked to financial support
for the child—it forms the basis for a constitutional holding.90  In this sense,
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03 cmt. g (2002) [hereinafter ALI Principles].  One can
argue that men, who benefit from a more advantageous position economically, are in a
stronger position to demonstrate parental rights because of their financial contributions to
the family.  However, breadwinning alone will rarely, if ever, suffice. See A.H. v. M.P.,
447 Mass. at 839 (citing ALI Principles, supra, § 2.03(1)(c)(ii)(B)) (a significant factor
the court considers is whether the adult “perform[s] a share of caretaking functions at
least as great as that of the parent with whom the child primarily lives.”)).
83 See LES PARAPLUIES DE CHERBOURG (Parc Film 1964). In the film Umbrellas of
Cherbourg, the lead, Catherine Deneuve, becomes pregnant by a soldier who goes off to
fight in Algeria.  Tormented by the possibility of being an unwed mother, she marries
another man who outwardly regards the child as his own.  This narrative reinforces the
perception that a man who admits to fathering a child must really be the father, because
society presumes a man would not otherwise accept such a financial burden. See supra
notes 65–66 and accomanying text. R
84 Nancy Dowd, Parentage at Birth: Birth Fathers and Social Parenthood, 14 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J.  909, 909–14 (2006).
85 Thanks to Julie Shapiro for this nuance on the legal default rules.
86 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 56–57 (2001).
87 Id. at 60.  However, the mother must have previously lived in the United States
continuously for one year. Id.
88 Id. at 59.
89 Id. at 62.
90 See Erin Chlopak, Comment, Mandatory Motherhood and Frustrated Fatherhood:
The Supreme Court’s Preservation of Gender Discrimination in American Citizenship
Law, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 967, 987 (2002) (“the statute appears to rely on, and functions to
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it is a higher burden than a woman may face because the presumption of the
lineage cannot be taken as a given in this context.
To escape this world of “sexed” mothering (and fathering), we need to
envision one characterized by “unsexed parenting,” where biosex and pa-
rental roles are not bifurcated.  Such “unsexed parenting,” where men and
women are parents instead of fathers and mothers, opposes dyads where bi-
osex rules mandate parental roles that arise from fixed biosex identity.  Un-
sexing mothering would have distributional consequences for women by
granting greater access to high-level work, while giving men an opportunity
to participate more fully in familial duties.  Each of the biological phenom-
ena that social and legal norms inject with “mothering” and “fathering”
meanings can be peeled apart from their actual biological functions to allow
individuals to parent, mother, and father without the constrictive framing of
socio-legal predeterminations.  Part II will explore the meaning of unsexing
this sexed world of parenting.
II. THE PROLIFERATION OF “UNSEXED” PARENTING
In this Part, Subpart A first defines “unsexed” parenting with greater
clarity.  Then it elaborates on the proliferation of different kinds of unsexed
parenting, among single/multiple/blended families, lesbian and gay families,
and transgender families.  Subpart B discusses the extent to which unsexed
parenting has taken root in same-sex parented families and non-dyad-driven
households.  Although the increasing prevalence of “alternative” families is
well-trod, its meaning in terms of sex roles has only begun to surface.  Fi-
nally, Subpart C explores a theoretical framework for unsexed parenting.
A. A Shift from Sex Neutrality to Unsexed
By “unsexed parenting,” I mean parenting pulled away from its
grounding in biosex.  Parenting includes childcare defined as “mothering”
and “fathering,” as well as childcare that may be labeled neither, either, or
both.  The knot of sex and parenting should be unwound entirely, apart from
the (admittedly substantial) biological realities of pregnancy and lactation.91
endorse, generalizations regarding the traditional parenting roles of mothers and
fathers.”).
91 I deliberately want to avoid engaging in a debate here over whether these biologi-
cal functions determine that women are preordained to have a closer relationship with
their biological children. Indeed, in some cases, these acts, which can encompass a good
part of the beginning of a child’s life, may lead to a far closer bond between mother and
child. See Enrico Rossoni et al., Emergent Synchronous Bursting of Oxytocin Neuronal
Network, 4 PUB. LIBR. OF SCI. COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY 1, 9–11 (2008) (concluding that
suckling produces oxytocin in the mother’s brain, which creates a positive feedback
mechanism that facilitates bonding).  This bond is not one that exists in every case.  Sur-
rogates give up children to whom they have given birth, women who experience dislike
for their newborn as part of postpartum depression, and other circumstances arise, includ-
ing a wide range of possible bases for a woman’s inability to parent.  Lactation is strongly
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In the actual act of parenting, biology plays no necessary role.92  Unsexed
mothering is relational, not biological, and it is an act, not a fixed identity.93
While biological elements may undoubtedly further that relationship, one
need not engage in these functions in order to mother a child.94 A male par-
ent could say to others, “I am the child’s mother.”95
I focus here on unsexing mothering because mothering has been framed
as the primary parent relationship.  Because of this primary parent status, I
suspect that, as a distributional matter, expanding mothering will effect
greater transformation toward unsexing.  Unsexing fathering may open room
for people of all sexes to “father,” but if the central role of “mothers” in
families remains, unsexing fathering would have a relatively smaller trans-
formative impact.  As will become apparent in the discussion of the Swedish
example in Part III, recasting fathering as a socially fundamental act has
involved reifying objectionable tropes of masculinity.96  Casting fathering as
something more than breadwinning constitutes a challenging and compelling
parallel project.  My focus on “mothering” rather than “fathering” seeks to
unsex the explicitly sexed, in the sense that distributive inequalities frame
women as having a “sex” while “men” remain “universal” and “neutral.”97
Many societies frame “mothering” as a critical but private task, unremuner-
ated, and therefore subordinate.  Opening up the roles of “mother” to men
(and implicitly the role of “father” to women) would liberate men from the
confines of high-breadwinning, low-caretaking parenting, and may educate
men as to the distributive nature of sex inequality.
Likewise, unsexing parenting is a distinct project.  Unsexing “mother”
(i.e. the female parent currently assumed to be the primary parent) and “fa-
ther” (i.e. the male parent currently assumed to be the secondary parent)
favored as a means to provide children with immune system benefits and bonding with
their biological mothers. See e.g., BREASTFEEDING, WOMENSHEALTH.GOV, http://www.
womenshealth.gov/breastfeeding/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2011).  Many women, however,
experience substantial difficulties with lactation and do not experience it as a means to
bond with the child.  Bonnie Rochman, Postpartum Depression and Difficulty Breast-
feeding May Go Hand in Hand, TIME, Aug. 5, 2011, http://healthland.time.com/2011/08/
05/do-depression-and-difficulty-breast-feeding-go-hand-in-hand/.  Over the course of a
child’s life, as measured in years, the bulk of parenting occurs after these formative mo-
ments, and can be performed by a person of any sex who has or does not have a biologi-
cal connection to the child.
92 See supra Part I.B.1.  With adopted children, parents have no genetic link but are
parents in the same way that parents of a biological child are.
93 See id.
94 See Sanger, supra note 35, at 17–20 (critiquing the term “mother” and its transfor- R
mation from a traditional definition—akin to “housewife”—to broader notions that in-
clude working, non-married, lesbian, etc. women).
95 Although it would achieve a great deal to strip the normative “primary” status
from mothering, I doubt whether an appellation solely carried by one sex “women”
would truly escape from presumptions of primary parenthood.
96 See infra Part III.C.
97 Many scholars have made this point and indeed the entire push for CEDAW may
be seen as a recognition that women were excluded from understandings of the universal.
See e.g., Arvonne S. Fraser, Becoming Human: The Origins and Development of Women’s
Human Rights 21 HUM. RTS Q. 853, 853–55 (1999).
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may lead toward the diminution of the terms’ distinctions, and may even
serve as a precursor to unsexing parenting.  The process of unsexing mother-
ing may ultimately eliminate the presumption that the primary parent is the
mother, in which case a parent of any sex could claim to be the primary
parent.  This unsexed parenting is a possible result of unsexed mothering,
but it is not a necessary one.  Eventually, untethered from assigned sex,
“mother” and “father” may carry less meaning than “parent,” but that is a
side effect rather than the principal purpose of unsexing mothering and fa-
thering.  “Mothering” and “fathering” may take on new meanings as they
become untethered from biosex.  Indeed, they may be joined by other sex-
neutral terms, terms with more appeal than “primary parent” and “secon-
dary parent.”
But to unsex parenting entirely would require the precursor of universal
androgyny, which I cannot advocate at this point.  If we think of binarist
heteronormative assumptions of “mother” and “father” on one side of the
parenting spectrum and universal androgyny as its opposite, unsexing moth-
ering (and fathering) sits in the middle, allowing fluidity among the sexes as
to who is the mother, without making parents park their sex identities at the
door.98  My fear is that androgyny might undermine some of the playfulness
and even electricity in sex role differentiation.  Unsexing “mothering” (and
“fathering”) would eliminate the restrictive and subordinating elements of
parenting while allowing the adoption (and dismissal) of roles.   It means
allowing individuals to choose their roles without regard to sex, yet it per-
mits them to experience, even celebrate, if they wish, gender differences in
parenting.
Each parent, regardless of biosex, should be able to choose a parenting
role, whether gendered or not.  It follows that parents, and the law, might
then cease conceptualizing childcare as an endeavor that requires adherence
to one or the other role.  Thus, men can mother, father, or parent; women can
mother, father, or parent.  Men and women who construct their own gender
roles within traditional norms would find that unsexed parenting opens up
broader choices.99  Moreover, the many gender-bending, transgender, and in-
tersex people who fall between the male/female categories would feel freed
of pressures to adopt a sex position to become a mother or father.100  Instead,
they could simply categorize themselves as parents.
The implication for families beyond individual parental roles is clear:
stripped of the need for a “mother” and a “father,” parents may be same-
98 Thanks to Matthew Collibee for this suggested framework.
99 We also know that parents outsource their parenting, thus a nanny or a “manny”
may provide caretaking that functions as “mothering.”  Although I realize that the role of
money is no small matter within families, the question of whether mothering and father-
ing can be performed by careworkers is beyond the scope of this Article.
100 People who feel their identity is outside the male/female binary, of course, feel
pressure in nearly every aspect of their lives to self-define along the binary.  Being forced
into one of these roles as part of becoming a parent is just one additional form of oppres-
sion of the alternately sexed.
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sexed, differently-sexed, or multi-sexed.101  Parents would be expected to
provide nurturing, support, structure, and discipline to their children, but
they would not need to divide these and other elements of childcare based on
parental biosex.  A woman might be the “father” and the man a “mother”; a
same-sex couple might take on gender roles that are both “father” and
“mother” at the same time. Courts and legislatures would move beyond the
mother-father presumption to establish family governance for diverse paren-
tal family formations.  Having escaped from the male/female dyad, family
law regimes might even permit adults who have strong bonds with children,
but are not primary “parents,” to attain some legal status in recognition of
their childcare role.102
Two caveats about “unsexing” are in order.  First, unsexing is not the
same as 1970s formalist sex-neutrality. Frontiero v. Richardson and its
progeny stand against fixed constructions of male and female roles.103  These
cases posit that women and men should not be presumed to have particular
skills that enable or limit them based on biosex.  In arguing for “unsexing,”
I agree to a limited extent with this line of sex neutrality jurisprudence, but I
must account for more recent developments in the understanding of sex,
gender, and sexuality, as well as the effects of social realities, such as inter-
sectionality.104  We now know, based on social science, theory, and practice
that the identities of “male” and “female” are not irrevocably attached to
biosex.  Men can become women and women can become men.  Further-
more, gender itself shifts; “women” can be “masculine” and “men” can be
101 By multi-sexed, I mean that parents could inhabit different sexes at different times
as individuals, but I also mean to open the possibility of multiple individuals, each of one
distinct sex (whatever it may be), engaged in parenting a child or children.
102 Presently, it is difficult for non-parents to acquire such rights in the United States.
In 2000, the Supreme Court issued a rare family law opinion in Troxel v. Granville, 530
U.S. 57 (2000).  In that case, a Washington state court granted visitation rights to paternal
grandparents following the death of the child’s father. Id. at 61.  The Supreme Court held
that parents have a constitutional right to raise their children, which includes the right to
refuse visitation by other people, including relatives. Id. at 75.
103 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 678–79 (1973) (holding that the U.S. mili-
tary’s unequal treatment of military husbands in contrast to military wives constituted an
equal protection violation).  This ruling served as a prominent point in the evolution of
the Supreme Court’s sex discrimination jurisprudence.
104 The liberal legal feminist norm of sex neutrality achieves certain theoretical pur-
poses but falls short in its failure to account for the complexity of identity.  In addition to
Fineman’s critique of this line of legal theory, see Fineman, The Neutered Mother, supra
note 10, I want to note that the construct of sex neutrality surfaced well before much sex R
and gender theory accounted for the fluidity of identity and the interrelationship among
nuanced notions of sex, gender, and sexuality. See, e.g., Francisco Valdes, Queers,
Sissies, Dykes and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender” and
“Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 16 (1995)
(“This Project . . . reveals and concludes that, under the conflation [of the terms sex,
gender, and sexual orientation], there is no such thing as discrimination ‘based’ solely or
exclusively on sexual orientation.”).
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“feminine.”  Both of these realities move beyond Frontiero’s basic frame-
work of formal sex neutrality.105
Formal sex neutrality undoubtedly rests on wider social and constitu-
tional support than unsexing.  Equality of opportunity is the touchstone of
sex and gender jurisprudence, including the resistance to affirmative action
efforts.  Each individual should be able to hold any role in society without
regard to biosex.  A woman should be able to be a Chief Executive Officer;
a man, a stay-at-home parent.  Formal sex neutrality and gender stereotyping
jurisprudence reaches toward unsexing, but it does not explicitly undo the
biosex presumptions of legal norms.106  Unsexing not only peels sex from
biosex, but it also surpasses investing gender with any reified link to biosex.
In this sense, the “unsexed mother” differs sharply from the “neutered
mother” that Martha Fineman criticizes.  The concept of the “neutered
mother” purges women of their gender, reducing them to sex-neutral indi-
viduals for legal analysis.107  Unsexing mothering has nothing to do with
105 Critics may argue that the idea of unsexing parenting parallels the ideas of the
early 1970s feminist movement—in particular the workings of then-attorney Ruth Bader
Ginsburg.  Believing that gender equality should “work both ways,” Ginsburg attacked
gender role stereotyping through male plaintiffs. See Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyp-
ing Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 91–92
(2010).  Thus, in 1972, Ginsburg began work on Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636
(1975). Id. at 132–33.  At the time, Social Security benefits from a deceased father were
payable, in part, to the widow and couple’s minor children in her case. See Weinberger,
450 U.S. at 637.  However, a deceased mother’s benefits were payable only to her minor
children and not her widowed husband. See id. at 637–38.  The Supreme Court held the
law unconstitutional because it denied benefits to working women that working men
received. Id. at 638–39.  This case highlights the apparent connection between unsexing
parenting and the work of Ginsburg—a connection some might view critically.  In partic-
ular, in the face of a growing conservative movement, rather than defend same-sex rela-
tions, Ginsburg stated that equality between the sexes did not implicate that issue.  Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment: A Question of Time, 57
TEX. L. REV. 919, 937 (1979).  These and other tactical mistakes made Second Wave
feminism poorly received by later movements.  My argument here builds on Ginsburg’s
work, but seeks to go much further.  Ginsburg wanted male and female roles, particularly
in the family unit, to be interchangeable.  However, she still deployed, perhaps as a rea-
sonably practical litigation tactic, the male/female binary—a rigid system I seek to have
dissolved.
106 See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Ann Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (applying
Title VII to a suit alleging sex discrimination in a hiring decision).  Although Price
Waterhouse enforces sex neutrality under Title VII, and extends it to encompass sex ster-
eotyping, Title VII and other laws have not directly sought to undo legal and social de-
faults that prevent women from attaining equality in the market. See id.
107 Fineman notes:
It is only the legal discourse, not society, that is now formally Mother purged.
The very gendered and Mothered lives most women live continue.  Equality rhet-
oric successfully neutered Mother as a unique legal construct, but has failed to
erase Mother on the societal level, nor has it removed the material manifestations
of the institution of Motherhood.  Furthermore, the disparity between the experi-
ence of Mother and her neutered legal presentation is potentially threatening to
the legal system’s commitment to gender neutrality.  If Mother continues to be
experienced as “different,” “special” accommodations will be demanded (and
delivered) even within a formally neutral family law system.
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robbing a woman of her gender, or subjugating her to sex-neutral rules that
devalue her gendered realities.108  It is not about reducing a woman’s status
as mother, but rather opening that status up to people of all other sexes.
Indeed, Fineman endorsed the position that men can be mothers, al-
though she did not fully explore it.109  Unsexed mothering positions a mother
as a relational entity, holding that position through interaction with her (or
his) child.  Fineman goes a step further, saying, “I argue [men] must be
Mothers in the stereotypical nurturing sense of that term—that is, engaged in
caretaking.”110  Although unsexed mothering certainly should open the op-
portunity for men and other sexes to occupy the “mother” role, ideally such
unsexing will eventually lead to a conception of “fathering” and “parent-
ing” as legitimate caretaking.
In addition to the distinction between unsexing and 1970s sex neutral-
ity, another caveat is that unsexing does not mean sex-less.  In using the
term “sex-less,” I refer to sex in both its meanings—biosex and sexuality.
First, regarding biosex, let me start with an example.  Recently, a story sur-
faced of a young Swedish couple raising their child, “Pop” without any
public knowledge of his or her biosex.111  Pop freely switches between wear-
ing boy and girl clothes.112  The parents chose to keep Pop’s biosex a secret
so that Pop would have a self-understanding beyond sex or gender.113  In
advocating for unsexing, I do not mean to advocate for a society in which
one’s sex or gender becomes a dirty secret.  I admire the couple’s tenacity in
presenting Pop to the world without a sex label, but do not intend for un-
sexing to impose such a practice on others.  In this sense, unsexed parenting
would not mandate the elimination of sex or gender roles—as long as those
roles do not presume biosex or fixed gender bases.  When a woman parent
performs a “fatherly” role, it may be masculine, but it reflects unsexed
parenting.  A person does not need to “lose” all references to her biosex as
long as biosex does not by itself define her parental role.  A woman can have
a child with her own ovaries, carry the child in her womb, and then nurture
the child with her breast milk, but it does not make her more of a mother
than someone who has done none of those things but nurtures the child in
other ways.  In my preliminary understanding, parenting would not need to
be counter-stereotype to be unsexed; yet, given the predominance of sexed
FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, supra note 73, at 89. R
108 Id. at 101 (“Corresponding to these movements in legal doctrine has been the
devaluation of the concept of Mother as a status worthy of any unique legal significance.
The neutering of Mother and the granting of rights disassociated from caretaking or nur-
turing has important implications for mothers and their children in all contexts.”).
109 See id. at 234 (“I believe that men can and should be Mothers.”).
110 Id. at 234–35.
111 Lydia Parafianowicz, Swedish Parents Keep 2-Year-Old’s Gender Secret, THE LO-
CAL, June 23, 2009, http://www.thelocal.se/20232/20090623/.
112 Id.
113 Id.
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parenting norms, parenting that matches sex stereotype might still merit ex-
amination for echoes of sexed parenting.
Unsexing should not be sex-less either, in the sense of being without
sexuality.  I would avoid an Andrea Dworkin-esque sexual ethos in which
every male-female binary becomes an objectionable form of dominance.114
Indeed, androgynous utopias pose the risk of heightening the phenomenon
that Suzanne Kim refers to as the “neutered parent,” in which well-regarded
parental behavior mandates the parent’s foregoing sexual expression.115  With
regard to “sex” as identity, unsexing “mothering” and “fathering” should
not obligate parents to a sex-less parenting or constrain individuals from
adopting “mother” or “father” roles.  Unsexed mothering should not be sex-
uality-less either.  Sexlessness would function as an imposition of conscious
ethical commitments on the erotic.  Such a willingness to impose norms on
sexual pleasure mirrors the control the Roman Catholic Church has sought to
exercise over male-female sex, insisting that sexual pleasure should solely
be embraced to procreate.  Sex, by its nature, functions largely in the sub-
conscious and an effort to unsex sexuality entirely would fail.116  Equality
may result from this unsexed vision, but not necessarily one that would elim-
inate the sexiness of sex difference.
Unsexed parenting involves a spectrum of parental structures outside
the mother-father dyad.  For example, it includes much single parenting,
114 See ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE xxx (1987) (explaining that “Intercourse is
a book that moves through the sexed world of dominance and submission”).
115 In The Neutered Parent, Suzanne Kim explores the judicial preference for “sex
neutral” parenting through the lenses of custody and visitation law.  Suzanne Kim, The
Neutered Parent 24 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 5), availa-
ble at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1935945.  She argues that sexually active mothers and
same-sex parents are viewed as “sexually salient” and, as a result, suffer harms under
family law models for falling outside the “sex neutral” norm. See id.  In the past, sexual
nonconformity has included homosexual parents merely admitting their sexual orienta-
tion (and thus not being discreet). Id. at 34.  This is in stark contrast to custody cases
involving heterosexual married couples, where sexual relations are only relevant if liter-
ally done in the presence of the child. See id. at 39.  Other “sexually salient” issues
raised in custody and visitation law have included overnight guests, sharing beds with
same-sex partners, and hugging and kissing same-sex partners in front of children. Id. at
47.  Kim finds that “[t]he neutering of sexually salient parents reinforces the marital,
gendered norms at the core of the prevailing parental sexuality framework.” Id. at 60.
She calls for a reexamination of the “sex neutral” framework under the law to facilitate a
nuanced conception of parental sexuality. Id. at 64.  Clifford Rosky has also worked on
understanding the ways in which lesbian and gay parents’ sexualities are framed as harm-
ful for their children.  Clifford Rosky, Don’t Kiss, Don’t Tell: Lesbian Mothers, Gay Fa-
thers, and the Regulation of Intimate Conduct 2–8 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (comparing restrictions against gay fathers and lesbian mothers exposing children
to intimate contact in custody and visitation cases).
116 Here one might think of some of the work of Catharine MacKinnon or Andrea
Dworkin in attempting to imagine a sexuality without oppression, indeed without sex
roles.  This effort, many critics noted, was entirely too utopian. See, e.g., Gayle Rubin,
Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, in THE LESBIAN
AND GAY STUDIES READER 34 (Henry Abelove & Michele Aina Barale eds., 1993)
(“Feminism is no more capable than Marxism of being the ultimate and complete account
of all social inequality.”).
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which necessarily involves parenting that simultaneously falls under both the
“father” and “mother” aegis.  Same-sex and transgender parents (many of
whom live as part of same-sex couples) often live beyond the male-female
dyad.  As traditional marriage was and continues to be structured around sex
roles, permitting same-sex marriage may undo that sexedness, as some of the
language in the recent Perry v. Schwarzenegger litigation suggests.117  As
marriage becomes unsexed, so should the relationship between “sex” and
the parental role.
B. Single, Multiple and Blended Parents
When considering parenting structures that deviate from the mother/
father dyad, same-sex parents immediately come to mind.  Before address-
ing that issue, the broader phenomenon of single, multiple, and blended-
parent households should be discussed because it too deviates from sexed
parenting privilege.  Single-parents, much like same-sex parents, must play
roles that are traditionally occupied by both a mother and a father, often
simultaneously.118  This household organization is quite commonplace and
comprises homes for over a quarter of all children.119  Although over four-
fifths of single parents are women, men are increasingly serving as single-
parents; some even choose to become parents while single.120  The absence
of a “father parent” in such homes has little impact on childhood develop-
ment—the crucial factor is “good” parenting.121  To the extent that single
parent homes lack stability, it may be traced to the single parent’s inability to
specialize in labor—such specialization leads to markedly greater financial
117 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 998 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“The tradition of restricting marriage
to opposite-sex couples does not further any state interest.  Rather, the evidence shows
that Proposition 8 harms the state’s interest in equality, because it mandates that men and
women be treated differently based only on antiquated and discredited notions of gen-
der.”). See also id. at 958 (“Marriage between a man and a woman was traditionally
organized based on presumptions of a division of labor along gender lines. . . .  Women
were seen as suited to raise children and men were seen as suited to provide for the
family.”).
118 See Marie Richmond-Abbott, Sex Role Attitudes of Mothers and Children in Di-
vorced, Single-Parent Families, 8 J. DIVORCE 61, 63–64 (1984) (examining the sex-stere-
otyped behavior of 134 single mothers).
119 TIMOTHY S. GRALL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CUSTODIAL MOTHERS AND FATHERS
AND THEIR CHILD SUPPORT: 2007 1 (2009), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2009pubs/p60-237.pdf (reporting that in 2007, 26.3 percent of children under 21 years of
age lived in a household with one parent and their other parent lived outside of the
household).
120 Id. at 2; Mireya Navarro, The Bachelor Life Includes a Family, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
7, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/fashion/07single.html.
121 One research note compiled studies that examined the effects on the psychological
and social development of children raised by a single woman or a lesbian couple—spe-
cifically the effect of an absence of father parenting.  Maurice Rickard, Research Note
no. 41 2001–02: Children of Lesbian and Single Women Parents, PARLIAMENT OF AUST-
LRALIA:  PARLIAMENTARY LIBRARY (June 4, 2002), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/
library/pubs/rn/2001-02/02rn41.htm.
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resources for heterosexual, married households.122  Issues like paid parental
leave, discussed later on, are even more crucial for single parents because
they lack the financial advantage of having a working partner in the home.
While the commonplace nature of female-led single parent homes sup-
ports the presumption that mothering is the primary mode of parenting, sin-
gle mothers often engage in fathering and parenting alongside their
mothering in ways that women partnered with men may not.  The lack of a
dyad, in itself, may subvert the sexed nature of mothering.  As June Carbone
and Naomi Cahn have demonstrated, the impact of these differences varies
substantially across jurisdictions: certain states favor traditionally sexed
marital and parental relations, while others favor a more unsexed vision of
both.123
Multiple and blended parents involve sets of more than two individuals
who serve as parents.  In a multiple parent home, the parents come together
to form a larger set of individuals to share childrearing.  Some examples
include a lesbian couple that finds a sperm donor who will share in some
childcare, or a gay couple who shares parenting with the woman who carries
the child.  It could also be any other formation of friends and lovers who
choose to share the responsibilities of childcare.  For LGBT individuals,
such arrangements may serve as a way to create a family without incurring
the expense of paid surrogacy.  Blended families result from the formation,
separation, and re-formation of couples, creating sets of stepparents. As
adult relationships shift, children may benefit from new people engaging in
childcare while they maintain their connection to adults who are former part-
ners of a parent. All of these kinds of parents may have a higher proclivity
for unsexed parenting in that their functional performance of parental roles
could easily diverge from the mother-father dyad.
122 See SARAH O. MEADOWS, SARA MCLANAHAN & JEAN T. KNAB, ECONOMIC TRA-
JECTORIES IN NON-TRADITIONAL FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN 3–4 (2009), available at http://
crcw.princeton.edu/workingpapers/WP09-10-FF.pdf.  This report examines data from the
Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, which follows 4,898 children born in large
U.S. cities, 3,712 of whom come from unmarried parents. Id. at 8.  The authors refer to
the proposition of economists and sociologists that marriage increases family well-being
because: (1) “two people can live more cheaply than one;” (2) “marriage encourages
gender role specialization between husbands and wives which is expected to increase
husbands’ labor market productivity and earnings;” (3) married men may be viewed by
employers as more dependable and therefore be paid more; and (4) “marriage provides
men with a script or identity . . . which encourages them to work longer hours to support
their families.” Id. at 3.
123 See NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES 1–6 (2010).
June Carbone and Naomi Cahn argue that the United States has seen a proliferation of
two kinds of families, “red” and “blue,” which are distinguished largely by their rela-
tionship emphasis and closely follow the Democrat/Republican divisions of the 2004 and
2008 elections. Id. at 1–2, 5–6.  Blue families profess autonomy and support, while red
families profess traditional roles for men and women with a strong emphasis on conse-
quences for those who do not follow them. Id. at 1–2.
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1. Same-sex and Transgender Parents
This Subpart examines same-sex parenting’s role in unsexing parenting.
Then it focuses on challenges to the legitimacy of transgender parents.  Al-
though the issues facing same-sex couples and couples including one or
more transgender partners differ, both groups may find some answer in
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, the reasoning of which lays the groundwork for
dismantling the centrality of sexedness in marriage.124  Although legal argu-
ments about parental rights and marriage have emphasized how same-sex
parents function the same way that different-sexed parents do, in many
ways, same-sex parents often become parents and live as parents differently
from their heterosexual counterparts.  Although many developmental psy-
chology studies emphasize the extent to which children of same-sex
parented families “do at least as well as those raised by heterosexuals in
cognitive ability, behavior, and mental health, and they may even do some-
what better in some areas,”125 these studies have only been used to demon-
strate that same-sex parents are not worse parents than heterosexual
parents.126  These studies have dispatched any claims to legitimacy in anti-
same-sex parenting arguments,127 a fact noted by the court in Perry.128  In-
124 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 935 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
125 See CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 123, at 131. R
126 Lisa Belkin, An End to Gay-Adoption Bans?, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2010, http://
parenting.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/28/an-end-to-gay-adoption-bans/?scp=1&sq=lisa
%20belkin%20gay&st=cse [hereinafter Belkin, An End to Gay Adoption Bans?] (identi-
fying recent studies that demonstrate that there is no basis for a ban on lesbian and gay
adoption).  Two studies in particular serve to prove this point: “With regard to parenting,
Allen and Burrell (1996) and Stacey and Biblarz (2001) concluded that decades of re-
search has consistently shown that sexual orientation is not a relevant factor in terms of a
person’s ability to parent or in terms of the psychological adjustment of the children.”
Marcus C. Tye, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Parents: Special Considera-
tions for the Custody and Adoption Evaluator, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 92, 95 (2003).  The
testimony in Perry v. Schwarzenegger demonstrated this reality: psychologist Michael
Lamb testified that “all available evidence shows that children raised by gay or lesbian
parents are just as likely to be well-adjusted as children raised by heterosexual parents
and that the gender of a parent is immaterial to whether an adult is a good parent.”  704
F. Supp. 2d at 935.
127 One prominent study examined child development and parenting in 106 families
(fifty heterosexual, twenty-nine gay, and twenty-seven lesbian) by interviewing both the
parents and outside caregivers, including the children’s teachers.  Rachel H. Farr, Stephen
L. Forssell & Charlotte J. Patterson, Parenting and Child Development in Adoptive Fami-
lies: Does Parental Sexual Orientation Matter? 14 APPLIED DEV. SCI. 164, 164 (2010),
available at http://wiwp.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Patterson-Farr-Forssell-Ap-
pliedDevScience-Jul-2010.pdf.  Parents in all three types of families, as well as the chil-
dren’s teachers, reported that the children generally functioned well and had few
behavioral problems, but the children of lesbian and gay parents were described as having
fewer behavioral problems than children of heterosexual parents. Id. at 171–72.  The
children’s gender role behavior, activities, and characteristics were found to be within the
population average Preschoolers’ Activities Inventory, which led the authors to conclude
that “parental sexual orientation is not as influential in young children’s gender develop-
ment as previously thought.” Id. at 172, 175.  Therefore, the study generally concludes
that gay and lesbian parents are capable parents, that their sexual orientation does not
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deed, the authoritative understanding of social science in that case permits
deliberation beyond defensiveness toward a consideration of differences be-
tween same-sex and different-sex parenting.  Some of the differences be-
tween heterosexual and same-sex families surface from legal and social
statuses.
Same-sex parents, for example, often differ from different-sex parents
in the extent of planning required to become a parent.  Although most les-
bian, gay, and bisexual parents become parents through a heterosexual pair-
ing, for other LGB parents, the process requires substantial planning.129  As
Judge Smith of the New York Court of Appeals noted, heterosexual families
may happen accidentally, making the planned same-sex families more sta-
ble, and thus less in need of the security provided by marriage.130  To be sure,
it is not advisable to succumb to the notion that LGBT parents are better and
therefore deserve less protection; however, it is important to consider
whether same-sex parents’ experiences serve as an opportunity for reconsid-
ering the legal regimes of parenting for all.131  At a time when same-sex
parents continue to face discrimination in becoming parents, including laws
which make adoption more difficult for them,132 same-sex parents’ methods
of adapting to multiple careers and contemporary gender roles may yield
productive norms for non-same-sex parenting structures.
Same-sex parents often divide responsibilities more evenly than their
heterosexual counterparts.133  At the very least, in the aggregate this reflects
less sexed parenting, if not some unsexed parenting.  This balanced practice
relate to their parenting skill or child’s adjustment, and that there is no basis for refusing
to allow same-sex couples to adopt. Id. at 176–77.
128 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 938–44 (finding credible expert
testimony that same-sex parents are not worse than heterosexual parents).
129 For an account of my own experience, see Rosenblum, Pregnant Man?, supra
note 1, at 209–15.  For lesbians, at least a sperm provider is required, if not the medical R
personnel to implant the sperm either in the woman’s body or into the ovum.  For gay
men, the process requires an egg provider and a surrogate to carry the fetus.  Most often,
as in the gestational surrogacy process, these are two separate women.  To coordinate egg
providers, surrogates, medical clinics and intended parents, agencies have sprung up to
provide matching as well as legal and counseling services.
130 Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 21–22 (N.Y. 2006) (denying plaintiffs’ same-
sex marriage and holding that the legislature could rationally believe that it is better for a
child to grow up with a mother and a father). See also Halley, supra note 30, at 6–8 R
(discussing the origins of the argument that heterosexuals need marriage more than same-
sex couples).
131 For example, at least one commentator has argued that heterosexual families can
learn from the parenting styles of same-sex-parented families.  Lisa Belkin, What’s Good
for the Kids, N. Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 5, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/11/08/magazine/08fob-wwln-t.html.
132 Overview of State Adoption Laws, LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/
our-work/issues/marriage-relationships-family/parenting/overview-of-state-adoption.html
(last visited Nov. 7, 2011) (summarizing state same-sex adoption laws).
133 See Belkin, What’s Good for the Kids, supra note 133 (quoting and citing Abbie
E. Goldberg, author of Lesbian and Gay Parents and Their Children, as saying: “‘Same-
sex parents tend to be more equal in parenting . . . .’  [L]esbian mothers . . . tend not to
divide chores and responsibilities according to gender-based roles.”).
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of childcare may inculcate their children with less rigid gender roles.134  At
least one psychologist suggests that this is “‘because you have taken gender
out [of] the equation.  There’s much more fluidity than in many heterosexual
relationships.’”135
It may not be that gender is absent from same-sex parenting, but gender
role rigidity is. “Same-sex” couples function within highly diverse sex and
gender roles, including some “butch-femme” male and female couples.
Such roles may frame gender expression as well as shared parenting itself.
Although it is unclear whether same-sex parents transmit gender differently
based on such butch-femme roles, parents do transmit their understandings
of gender to their children.136  Shared parenting does not necessarily “take[ ]
gender out [of] the equation”—gender is still very often omnipresent in the
family unit.137  The legal recognition of same-sex marriage may diminish the
sexedness of relationship recognition and parenting, but it will not abolish
the entrenched nature of sex and gender identity.  Many will continue to
think of parenting as “mothering” and “fathering,” constructs that bind only
if attached to biosex.
Transgender parents may also engage in “mothering” and “fathering”
beyond biosex.  It does not always require analogy to connect transgender
issues to lesbian and gay ones—by one count, forty percent of transgender
people are gay or lesbian.138  Some transgenders live and function in their
target sex, allowing those in heterosexual relationships to live in legally rec-
ognized marriages.  Transgenders who are in same-sex couples or who live
in states that refuse to recognize their changed biosex suffer the same lack of
parental legitimacy as parents who are a same-sex couple.  Many states have
134 See Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of
Parents Matter, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 159, 168 (2001).  Stacey and Biblarz analyzed twenty-
one studies of biological children of lesbian mothers and concluded that children raised in
these households are more likely to venture outside of the stereotypical male-female be-
havior. Id. at 167–68.  Additionally, while heterosexual mothers were observed encour-
aging their children to participate in gender stereotypical activities (e.g., daughters to take
ballet and sons to play little league) lesbian mothers were more concerned with support-
ing their child’s gender neutral interest. Id. at 172.
135 See Belkin, What’s Good for the Kids, supra note 131. R
136 See Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 134: R
For example, the lesbian mothers in Kweskin and Cook (1982) were no more
likely than heterosexual mothers to assign masculine and feminine qualities to an
“ideal” boy or girl, respectively, on the well-known Bem Sex Role Inventory.
However, mothers did tend to desire gender-traits in children that resembled those
they saw in themselves, and the lesbians saw themselves as less feminine-typed
than did the heterosexual mothers. This suggests that a mother’s own gender iden-
tity may mediate the connection between maternal sexual orientation and maternal
gender preferences for her children.
Id. at 172.  Even where a couple has a butch-femme relationship, the role-playing still
may subvert traditional understandings of gender.
137 Thanks to Noa Ben-Asher for this point.
138 ZACHARY I. NATAF, LESBIANS TALK TRANSGENDER 32 (1996).
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not yet decided what makes an individual “male” or “female,”139 although
they still recognize the distinction,140 most notably for marriage purposes.141
Disputes in family law litigation revolve around the recognition of the part-
ner’s chosen sex.142  Some litigants challenge the validity of their marriages
to transgender individuals for legal advantage.  For example, in In re Estate
of Gardiner, the court considered whether a marriage between a transgender
individual and someone of that person’s birth sex was legal.143  Marshall Gar-
diner, a man, married J’Noel, a woman who had been born in a man’s
body.144  After Marshall died intestate, his son, Joseph, convinced the Su-
preme Court of Kansas that the marriage was void as against public policy,
despite J’Noel having undergone sex reassignment surgery.145
Courts have also struggled to decide whether transgender identity
should be a factor in determining parental fitness.146  In Kantaras v.
Kantaras,147 Michael Kantaras, born a woman but living as a man after sex-
reassignment surgery, legally adopted a son that his wife, Linda, had with
another man in a prior relationship.148  Linda also gave birth to a daughter
after she was artificially inseminated with sperm from Michael’s brother.149
After a nine-year marriage, the two divorced and went to court over child
custody.150  Linda knew that Michael was transgender at the time of their
marriage, but nonetheless convinced the Florida Court of Appeals to invali-
date their marriage because he was transgender.151
139 Kari J. Carter, Note, The Best Interest Test and Child Custody: Why Transgender
Should Not Be a Factor in Custody Determinations, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 209, 220 (2006).
140 See Dean Spade, Documenting Gender: Incoherence and Rulemaking, 59 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 731, 732–34 (2008).
141 See Carter, supra note 139, at 220 n.83. R
142 Id.; see also Case, Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, supra note 24: R
This thin view reduces legal sex—in the sense of legal designation as male or
female—to little more than the basis for a claim of discrimination, allowing a
plaintiff, whether in a statutory or a constitutional case, to prevail by showing that
the plaintiff’s legal sex is a but-for cause of the treatment of which plaintiff
complains.
Id. at 1205.
143 42 P.3d 120, 121–22 (Kan. 2002).
144 Id. at 122.
145 Id. at 137.  Similarly, a Texas Court of Appeals held that a marriage between two
individuals born as men was invalid, despite one having undergone sex reassignment
surgery to become a woman.  Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999).  It
is important to note that other states do recognize these marriages.  In these cases, some
courts have recognized such a reassignment.  Notable among these states is New Jersey,
whose decision in M.T. v. J.T. demonstrates how, even in 1976, some judicial authorities
were able to view these questions from an objective standpoint.  355 A.2d 204, 211 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
146 See Carter, supra note 139, at 209–17. R
147 884 So. 2d 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
148 Carter, supra note 139, at 211–12. R
149 Id. at 212.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 214.  Likewise, the story of Thomas Beatie is illustrative of the struggles
endured by transgender parents. See Thomas Beatie, Labor of Love, THE ADVOCATE,
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLG\35-1\HLG102.txt unknown Seq: 35 12-JAN-12 9:50
2012] Unsex Mothering 91
Judicial disrespect for these established couples flips them from legiti-
mate heterosexual status to presumptively illegitimate homosexual status
through rigid adherence to the binarism.  For example, in In re Gardiner,
J’Noel could have married only a woman, even though she was a woman
after sex reassignment surgery, because Oklahoma refused to recognize the
sex change.  These deep fissures in legal logic demonstrate the need for un-
sexing parenting: transgender people are the miner’s canary of gender, ex-
posing the extent to which the law’s disparate treatment based on sex and
gender is arbitrary.152
While transgender experience with marital recognition provides one of
the strongest arguments for the senselessness of sex restrictions in mar-
riage,153 Perry v. Schwarzenegger,154 a case involving lesbian and gay
couples, confirms the value of unsexed marriage to people of all sexes (in-
cluding transgender people) who may want to marry another individual.
Judge Walker, presiding over Perry, found no “historical purpose for ex-
cluding same-sex couples from marriage, as states have never required
spouses to have an ability or willingness to procreate in order to marry. . . .
[T]he exclusion exists as an artifact of a time when the genders were seen as
having distinct roles in society and in marriage.”155  Relying on this finding,
Judge Walker ultimately held that California’s ban on same-sex marriage vi-
olated the U.S. Constitution.156
Here, Perry uses the language of gender, but discusses what I have
called “biosex.” The decision reflects the extent to which unsexed parenting
has become a burgeoning norm, one that the law should encourage. Perry’s
attention to revisiting gender norms reflects a welcomed departure for same-
sex marriage litigation.  In other recent cases, such as those in courts in
Connecticut, Iowa, and Massachusetts, the sex discrimination argument has
more frequently taken a backseat to sexual orientation equal protection argu-
ments.157  In Perry, Judge Walker made it clear that marriage has changed
Apr. 2008, http://www.advocate.com/Society/Commentary/Labor_of_Love/.  When Bea-
tie decided to become a parent, he was rejected by many physicians because he was a
transgender man who wanted to carry a child. Id. Marriage and parenting of transgender
people exposes some of the most core gender biases in these institutions, as the presump-
tion of roles leads to determinations that are patently counterintuitive. See Carter, supra
note 139, at 211–14. R
152 See Rosenblum, Sing Sing, supra note 19, at 551. R
153 See, e.g., Mary Coombs, Sexual Dis-Orientation: Transgendered People and
Same-Sex Marriage, 8 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 219, 257 (1998) (“No matter which strand
of the opposition’s argument against same-sex marriage we consider, transgendered mar-
riages and the subsequent legal response undermine those arguments.”).
154 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
155 Id. at 993.
156 Id. at 995 (“Proposition 8 violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
157 See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003)
(“For the reasons we explain below, we conclude that the marriage ban does not meet the
rational basis test for either due process or equal protection.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLG\35-1\HLG102.txt unknown Seq: 36 12-JAN-12 9:50
92 Harvard Journal of Law & Gender [Vol. 35
from a sharply gendered institution to one of equality, and the bases for
excluding same-sex couples from marriage have fallen away.158
As Mary Anne Case recently put it, “[t]o grant civil marriage licenses
to couples regardless of their sex would be to eliminate the last vestige of
sex stereotyping from the law of marriage in the United States.”159  Judge
Walker’s decision follows what Nan Hunter predicted almost twenty-years
ago in her landmark article on same-sex marriage: she asserted, correctly,
that lesbian and gay marriage would “dismantle the legal structure of gender
in every marriage.”160  Although this dismantling has not yet come to frui-
tion, the move toward unsexed parenting points in that direction.
C. The Import of Unsexed Parenting
In the face of so many who typify unsexed parenting or might benefit
from it, let us articulate the goal of such an endeavor.  Contemporary sex
discrimination litigation primarily seeks to prevent individuals from discrim-
inating against others on the basis of sex.  But the concept of sex discrimina-
tion originally had a broader promise, as the Hogan quote in the introduction
reflects.161  Moving beyond fixed notions of the roles and abilities of males
and females is an ambitious norm, particularly given the largely post-Fron-
tiero developments in understanding the interplay of sex, gender, and sexual
identity.162  Yet it is a norm that is not only encapsulated in United States
constitutional law, but is also a key player in international law.163
Like most family law rules and norms, law outside the family context
drives much of what happens inside the family context.  This is one of the
crucial lessons of recent moves to examine family law exceptionalism.164
158 Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 993 (“Gender no longer forms an essential part of
marriage; marriage under law is a union of equals.”).
159 Case, Same Sex-Marriage Litigation, supra note 24, at 1202.  Case continued: R
It would complete the evolution away from sex-role differentiated, inegalitarian
marriage law that began with nineteenth century efforts to ameliorate the effects
of coverture and continued in legislative reform and constitutional adjudication
through the last third of the twentieth century.  As feminist theorists have insisted
for decades, this would have benefits, not only for gay and lesbian couples, but
for all who value liberty and equality on the basis of sex.
Id. at 1202–03. See also MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERN-
MENT, AND AMERICA’S POLITICAL IDEAL 97 (2010) (“Privileging only marital heterosex-
ual relationships presents a further danger in that it reinforces a form of association
historically marked by gender inequality.  As Martha Fineman bluntly puts it, public pol-
icy that encourages heterosexual marriage for the sake of children thereby constitutes the
state’s willingness to sacrifice women’s interests for children’s.”).
160 Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW & SEXU-
ALITY REV. LESBIAN & GAY LEGAL ISSUES 9, 19 (1991).
161 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. R
162 See supra note 104. R
163 See infra Part III.
164 See generally Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative
Family Law: Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family Law Exceptionalism, 58
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Corporate governance law fits squarely in what Janet Halley and Kerry Rit-
tich define as “Family Law 3,” in that without mentioning family law sta-
tuses, corporate governance both depends on the status of individuals within
the family and affects family law regimes.165  Men derive substantial mate-
rial benefits from their advantaged place in the market economy.  Even with
extensive paid parental leave, some countries still face inequality in the
workplace, namely the fact that leadership and its correspondingly larger
incomes remain predominantly male.166  One solution has been the adoption
of a quota for corporate board representation to achieve gender balance.167
For example, to foster a more inclusive corporate sector, Norway created its
Corporate Board Quota to force publicly traded corporations to foster gender
diversity on their boards, a strategy that several other European nations have
AM. J. COMP. L. 753 (2010).  Halley and Rittich define the range of relevant family law
regimes:
Family Law 1—FL1—is what you will find in a modern family law code, course,
bar exam, or casebook.  It comprises marriage and its alternatives: divorce, paren-
tal status, and parental rights and duties; in some countries it includes inheritance
and in others, for interesting reasons, it does not.  But if you wanted to understand
how law contributes to the ways in which actual family and household life is lead
by actual people, you would never stop there.  You would immediately look for
the explicit family-targeted provisions peppered throughout substantive legal re-
gimes that seem to have no primary commitment to maintaining the distinctive-
ness of the family—regimes ranging from tax law to immigration law to
bankruptcy law.  We can call that Family Law 2, or FL2.  In the still-deeper back-
ground would then be Family Law 3—FL3—the myriad legal regimes that con-
tribute structurally but silently to the ways in which family life is lived and the
household structured, sometimes intentionally, sometimes in ways we could de-
scribe as functionally rational, sometimes in the mode of disparate impact or sheer
accident or even perversely.  For simple examples of FL3, imagine occupancy
limits in landlord/tenant law that give more or less protection to incumbents; em-
ployment rules that permit dismissal on the part of the employer “at will” or, by
contrast, require employers to give notice to employees who are dismissed with-
out cause; rules that exclude household employees from the protective legislation
governing workplaces or that craft special regimes governing such employees.
Finally, we take it as given that any probing legal analysis of the family or house-
hold, and certainly one that attempts to track the effects of legal rules on the
bargaining endowments of different household members, needs to attend to a
wide range of informal norms, as they may substantially alter the impact of FL1,
2, and 3 and, in some cases, effectively “govern” the household.  While their
status as law is a live question for us—as it has been for comparativists and legal
anthropologists at various times—we have no doubt that these norms belong
somewhere on the map and, at least for some purposes, we think of them as
Family Law 4 (FL4).
Id. at 761–62.
165 Id. at 762.
166 See, e.g., Rosenblum, Feminizing Capital, supra note 14, at 64–65 (noting ine- R
quality in Norweigian corporate boards despite some of the most progressive corporate
gender laws in the world).  See also REBECCA RAY, JANET C. GORNIK & JOHN SCHMITT,
CTR. FOR ECON. AND POLICY RESEARCH, PARENTAL LEAVE POLICIES IN 21 COUNTRIES 9
(2009), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/parental_2008_09.pdf.
167 See Representation of Both Sexes on Company Boards, MINISTRY OF CHILDREN,
EQUAL. AND SOC. INCLUSION, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/bld/Topics/Equality/
rules-on-gender-representation-on-compan.html?id=416864 (last visited Sept. 21, 2011).
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emulated.168  If Norway’s effort through the Corporate Board Quota to femi-
nize capital is successful, then it may also succeed in facilitating an unsexing
of mothering and parenting.
This effort to integrate corporate boardrooms with women has been
mirrored in Scandinavian nations by an effort to bring men into family lead-
ership.  Encouraging men to participate more fully in family responsibilities
also furthers the goal of unsexing.  As Mary Anne Case has commented:
“[i]f the question I begin with is, ‘Whose responsibility should care for
children be?,’ the answer I begin with is, ‘Not simply women’s responsibil-
ity.’” 169  If childcare is not solely women’s responsibility, then unsexing
mothering is key to ensure that shift.  My goal is precisely not to undermine
women’s rights within and without the family.  Rather, unsexing parenting
would further the balancing of family responsibilities.  By “unsexed parent-
ing,” I mean an assumption of responsibility that is commensurate with de-
cision-making power having no preordained sex.
Two elements of same-sex parenting discussed above, the compara-
tively egalitarian division of labor and extensive family planning, are both
elements of unsexed parenting.  To unsex parenting broadly would require a
state role in supporting shared parental involvement and responsibility.  One
such policy could target bringing men more aggressively into the responsi-
bilities of parenting.  Effecting such a policy necessarily entails a blurring of
sex roles for both heterosexual and homosexual couples: for heterosexuals, it
requires consistently refusing to presume that one party will play a particular
role because of his or her biosex; for same-sex couples, many of the roles are
already blurred, but not all.170
The planning element for gay and lesbian parents could extend to heter-
osexuals as well in the pursuit of unsexed parenting.171  If both members of a
heterosexual couple engaged in this process, it would permit each to voice
ideas about how to achieve a more balanced parenting process.
As the above discussion of same-sex parenting suggests, unsexing
parenting in the United States currently reflects a shift driven by society
more than the law.  It is a shift that has largely begun despite the law, as we
will see with the discussion of the U.S. Family Medical Leave Act
(“FMLA”) in Part III.  However, unsexing will require both individual par-
168 Id.  Both France and Spain have adopted quotas for women in corporate govern-
ance. See Julie C. Suk, Gender Parity and State Legitimacy: From Public Office to Cor-
porate Boards 2 (Mar. 3, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1776263.
169 Mary Anne Case, How High the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling Questions about
Where, Why and How the Burden of Case for Children Should Be Shifted, 76 CHI-KENT
L. REV. 1753, 1756 (2001).
170 See Belkin, What’s Good for the Kids, supra note 131. R
171 While Iowa requires parents to have a car seat before leaving the hospital with a
baby, it should also require more deliberate parenting, including classes on basic ele-
ments of nutrition and caretaking. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.446 (West 2011) (requir-
ing children under one year of age being transported in a motor vehicle to be “in a rear-
facing child restraint system”).
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ticipation and state-imparted norms.  Both international and domestic legal
frames establish those state norms.  Although international provisions do not
impose direct obligations on families, they do establish expectations for state
parties to achieve.   To determine what appropriate legal efforts might fur-
ther the goal of unsexing parenting, the following Part will explicate, respec-
tively, international and comparative legal contexts for unsexing parenting.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMPARATIVE (THIN AND THICK)
UNSEXING: THE UNITED STATES AND SWEDEN
This Part assesses several international treaties’ framing of parenthood
and maternity with respect to their sexedness, and then uses this interna-
tional background to frame a sharp distinction between the parental leave
regimes in the United States and Sweden.
Parental leave is at the core of a broader set of gender equality efforts.
Parental leave provisions can substantially shift the leaves taken by parents
to care for a new child, which, in turn, fosters or deters bonding with that
child.  Because of ideas about traditional gender roles, women are presumed
to be both responsible for and interested in taking care of a newborn (or
newly adopted) child, while (heterosexual) men are presumed to be both
incapable and uninterested in the minutiae of childrearing.  These men can
and should, society tells them, leave such duties largely to their wives and
stay in their domain of expertise—the workplace.  Thickly unsexed parental
leave would remedy this sexed vision of parenting that boxes women into
primary childcare and men out of it.
This Part proceeds as follows: Subpart A summarizes the development
of international law from before the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women (“CEDAW”) to the Yogyakarta
Principles and briefly assesses the relationship among national, international,
and comparative legal systems with regard to parenting.  Subpart B de-
scribes and critiques this critical law for workplace equality.  Subpart C as-
sesses Sweden’s parental leave policy, arguing that this policy assertively
promotes balanced, unsexed parenting.  Subpart D explores the differences
between the two laws and how a more assertive posture by the United States
would foster unsexed parenting.
A. International Law, from Sexed Paternalism to Sexed Liberation to
Unsexed Potential
This Subpart will recount the trajectory of international law from pre-
CEDAW framings that address women and children as society’s most vulner-
able, to CEDAW’s picture of women’s empowerment, to post-CEDAW con-
siderations that begin to contemplate an unsexed future.
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1. Pre-CEDAW Treaties
The grounding for CEDAW extends back to the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.  Article Twenty-Five of the Declaration states
“[m]otherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance.”172
These protections have a deep grounding in cultural traditions of viewing
women and children as “favorites of the law,” who deserved the law’s pro-
tection from predatory contracts.  The Declaration articulates its protection
of marriage rights in a sex-neutral (but implicitly heterosexual) frame.  Arti-
cle Sixteen reads: “[m]en and women of full age, without any limitation
due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a
family.  They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage, and
at its dissolution.”173  This language reflects a construction of rights around
marriage that adhere to “men” and “women” together.
Other important groundwork for CEDAW, as well as for the Convention
on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”), appeared in the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).  The international move to close
the public/private divide, a critical step in addressing family law questions in
international law, began in 1966 with a reference to parents in the ICCPR.174
However, it is worth noting that the provision merely grants autonomy to
parents to determine the religious upbringing of their children “to ensure the
religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own
convictions.”175  Although this provision serves to emphasize parents’ do-
minion, in it the ICCPR opened the possibility of a link between the public
and the private sectors.
2. CEDAW
International law primarily addresses the relationship among states and,
with respect to human rights, the relationship between states and individuals
as public entities.  CEDAW’s central focus was placing women’s rights at the
core of international law, and in pursuit of that goal, the drafters crafted
language that blurred the public and the private.176 A traditional understand-
172 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25, G.A. res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
173 Id. at art. 16.
174 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 18(4), opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).  Note that
the analysis of the ICCPR, CEDAW, CRC and the Yogyakarta Principles draws on the
texts of these documents and does not explore their interpretation.
175 Id.
176 CEDAW blurs these lines by addressing family life and sex roles in the context of
international law.  For example, the preamble states that signatories adopt its provisions:
Bearing in mind the great contribution of women to the welfare of the family and
to the development of society, so far not fully recognized, the social significance
of maternity and the role of both parents in the family and in the upbringing of
children, and aware that the role of women in procreation should not be a basis for
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ing of international law prior to CEDAW included no reference to parenting.
International law, as a field, only focused on public functions, such as the
direct interaction with the state and the ways that states respected or ignored
individual rights.  This focus on the “public” reinforced the extent to which
heads of households, customarily men, received almost total discretion over
how they ran their household: the public state’s refusal to regulate the “pri-
vate” family177 permitted domestic violence, rape, and other abuses to occur
within the home.178  For that reason, international law’s move to bridge the
public/private divide was a radical shift.  Having arrived relatively recently
into the area of regulating family life, international law may have avoided
some of the baggage carried by more entrenched national family law
regimes.
CEDAW marked the first true move in international law to breach the
public and private barriers.  This change remains one of CEDAW’s lasting
contributions to international legal discourse.  Women throughout the world
discrimination but that the upbringing of children requires a sharing of responsi-
bility between men and women and society as a whole.
CEDAW Treaty, supra note 6, at preamble; see also Rosenblum, Unsex CEDAW, supra R
note 4, at 1.  In Unsex CEDAW, I argued that CEDAW struggles to achieve its goal of R
improving women’s lives because it identifies the wrong reason for inequality. Id. Wo-
men are not subjugated solely because of the power relationship that establishes men as
superior.  Instead, women suffer from inequality in part because of the maintenance of
the male/female binary itself.  Binarisms, whether by design or not, necessarily frame
individuals in a top/bottom hierarchy.  Focusing only on “improving women’s lives”
serves to reify the sex binary.  I do not mean to say that women’s lives do not merit
improving—rather, I take issue with the central and exclusive framing of the problem in
this biosex light.  “Women’s lives” cannot be improved until being a “woman,” “man,”
or any sex means less in terms of social, legal, and political standing.  This is the chal-
lenge posed to women-centered feminism by transgender movements (in the United
States and elsewhere) and by Scandinavian feminism, which expressly seeks the reduc-
tion of gender differences. See generally SCANDINAVIAN CRITIQUE OF ANGLO-AMERICAN
FEMINIST THEOLOGY (Hanna Stenstrom et al. eds., 2007) (collection of articles engaging
in a critical dialogue with American feminist theology).  It is a challenge that has led to
the Yogyakarta Principles, a non-binding agreement by international law experts on sexu-
ality and gender-related rights.  THE YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES: PRINCIPLES ON THE APPLI-
CATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN RELATION TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION
AND GENDER IDENTITY (2007), http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles_en.pdf
[hereinafter YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES] .  In concluding that CEDAW should be more in-
clusive, I do not mean to exclude the need for remedies that focus on the inequality that
women face based on their identity.  Rather, I argue that the sole treaty in the interna-
tional landscape on sex discrimination must attempt to protect more than just “women’s
rights.”
177 Frances Olsen’s landmark work articulates a parallel between the two public/pri-
vate dichotomies most relevant to feminist analyses: the state/civil society division and
the market/family division. Frances E. Olsen, International Law: Feminist Critiques of
the Public/Private Distinction, in RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 157 (Dorinda G. Dallmeyer et al. eds., 1993).  The former “distinguishes ‘the state’
from the rest of society—public, state action from the private action of individuals and
nongovernmental groups,” while the latter separates the public world of the market,
work, and commerce from the private world of the family and home. Id. at 157, 160.
178 JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REVOLUTION
IS TRANSFORMING PRIVACY 5–6 (2009).
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confronted sexist “private” institutions; the drafters sought to bring interna-
tional law to bear on those harms.179  Despite CEDAW’s limited enforcement,
one major success of CEDAW is the extent to which some States Parties
have internalized its norms within their national legal systems.180  As Hilary
Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin have noted, CEDAW “acknowledges
that, for women, protection of civil and political rights is meaningless with-
out attention to the economic, social, and cultural context in which they op-
erate . . . .  The Women’s Convention also attempts to overcome the public/
private dichotomy observed in international law.”181
Although CEDAW focuses almost exclusively on “women’s rights,” it
does not solely talk about empowering mothers.  Rather, the Convention
seems to articulate an understanding of the value in shared parenting.  It
strikes a compelling balance between the recognition of the role women play
in childbirth and the shared roles of parents: the Preamble starts by recogniz-
ing women’s role in society, but quickly moves toward embracing “the role
of both parents in the family and in the upbringing of children.”182  Although
the Preamble does not use the terms “mother” and “father,” it clearly im-
plies both a dyad (both parents) and the presumption that this dyad consists
of a member of each of the two sexes (men and women).183
Other provisions support this dyadic heterosexual model.  Article
Eleven, Section Two, like the Preamble, first references specific women’s
issues and then expands to broader references to equality in the dyadic
model and, implicitly, sexed parental rights.184  Section Two frames this dis-
179 CEDAW Treaty, supra note 6, at preamble. R
180 See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 638–56 (2004) (drawing on the
meaning of the term “acculturation,” the process through which groups adopt the behav-
iors and beliefs of a surrounding culture.  They argue that this process can be “har-
nessed” by institutions in order to “socialize recalcitrant states” into complying with
international norms.).
181 HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 217 (2000).
182 CEDAW Treaty, supra note 6, at preamble.  While the Preamble further empha- R
sizes the “social significance of maternity,” it also supports a shared responsibility of
men and women in the family. Id.
183 It is worth noting that in the Spanish version, the term for “parents” is “padres,”
which is the plural of “father.”
184 Section Two of CEDAW states:
In order to prevent discrimination against women on the grounds of marriage or
maternity and to ensure their effective right to work, States Parties shall take
appropriate measures:
(a) To prohibit, subject to the imposition of sanctions, dismissal on the grounds of
pregnancy or of maternity leave and discrimination in dismissals on the basis of
marital status;
(b) To introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable social benefits
without loss of former employment, seniority or social allowances;
(c) To encourage the provision of the necessary supporting social services to en-
able parents to combine family obligations with work responsibilities and partici-
pation in public life, in particular through promoting the establishment and
development of a network of child-care facilities;
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cussion in the context of preventing discrimination against women with re-
gard to maternity and pregnancy.185  For that reason, it focuses on maternity
leave as a guarantee.  The first and last provisions of Section Two focus on
pregnancy—banning discrimination on the basis of pregnancy and protect-
ing pregnant women from harmful work.186  This focus, like that of the Pre-
amble, engages an issue specific to women’s biology; only individuals with
female reproductive organs may become biologically pregnant.  In Section
Two, CEDAW also protects women from discrimination based on maternity,
presuming that either: (1) it would not be possible for men to be victims of
discrimination based on paternity; or (2) even if it were possible, it is beyond
the scope of the Convention.187  Concerning the third requirement, Article
Eleven, Section Two, orders maternity leave with pay.  Maternity leave pro-
visions proved a radical innovation when CEDAW was drafted, but such
provisions may ultimately discourage employers from hiring women in the
first place.  As Part Three discusses, contemporary “parental leave” laws
move beyond a focus on women and adopt some form of sex neutrality, in
part to reduce leave-based discrimination against women.188
The Convention’s last provision that expressly addresses parenting is
less explicitly sexed, opening space for broader interpretation.  Several sets
of language here support the potential for a sex-neutral interpretation.  Arti-
cle Sixteen, Section One focuses on eliminating discrimination within mar-
riage by promoting the abandonment of the traditional patriarchal order.189
Subsections (d) and (f) emphasize that States Parties should foster parenting
“on a basis of equality of men and women.”190  Here, both provisions, like
Article Eleven Section Two, Subsection (c), aim for rights to be allocated on
a basis of equality between men and women.  These provisions address
equality in power over, as well as, responsibilities to the children.  Here,
(d) To provide special protection to women during pregnancy in types of work
proved to be harmful to them.
CEDAW Treaty, supra note 6, at art. 11 § 2. R
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 See CEDAW Treaty, supra note 6, at art 11 § 2. R
188 See infra Part III.  The fourth requirement of Article Eleven, Section Two, Subsec-
tion (c) urges States to “encourage . . . social services,” including “child-care facilities,”
“to enable parents to combine family obligations with work responsibilities and partici-
pation in public life.”  This provision does not reference “parents” as necessarily dyadic
nor sexed, although in context those meanings may be inferred. Id.  At the time of its
drafting, CEDAW’s sex neutrality regarding parenting may follow from the presumption
that parenting was another word for caretaking, which presumed only women performed.
189 CEDAW Treaty, supra note 6, at art. 16 § 1. R
190 Id. Subsection (d) provides for States Parties to ensure to both men and women
“[t]he same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective of their marital status, in
matters relating to their children; in all cases the interests of the children shall be para-
mount.” Id. at art. 16 § 2(d).  Subsection (f) provides for States Parties to ensure to both
men and women “[t]he same rights and responsibilities with regard to guardianship,
wardship, trusteeship and adoption of children, or similar institutions where these con-
cepts exist in national legislation; in all cases the interests of the children shall be para-
mount.” Id. at art. 16 § 2(f).
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again, no explicit language says “both parents,” opening the possibility of
multiple parents.191
Interestingly, the Convention’s provisions regarding parenting strike a
different tone from the rest of the treaty, referencing not only the expected
elements of “maternity” but also the “equality of men and women.”192
CEDAW achieves a great deal by breaching the public/private divide, but its
focus on women, in particular the provision for maternity leave, reflects an
underlying social reality that women dominate (and are dominated by)
parenting—a norm that both provides women with substantial social power
and deprives them of economic power.
3. Post-CEDAW International Law
International legal thought had shifted considerably toward a sex-neu-
tral and even perhaps an unsexed vision of parenting by 1990, when the
CRC entered into force.193  In this detailed treaty on the rights of children,
only one section focuses on women specifically.  Article Twenty-Four in-
cludes a provision for pre- and post-natal healthcare for mothers.194  All
other references are to “parents.”195  No reference is made to “women” or
“men,” establishing that this is not a sexed treaty in any explicit fashion.
However, the CRC does refer to “both parents” five times,196 limiting in that
sense which family compositions may benefit from its protections.
In addition, the Yogyakarta Principles197 was published, filling a void in
international law on the intersection of human rights and sex, gender, and
sexuality.  This document is not legally binding in any jurisdiction and only
constitutes an agreement by experts on a set of norms.  Nonetheless, the
principles provide a glimpse into how international law appears after four
decades of developments in gender and sexuality rights.  Principle Three
states that “[n]o status, such as marriage or parenthood, may be invoked as
191 Moreover, no explicit language states that the parents must be of different sexes.
Rather, the dyadic sexedness, to the extent present, draws on the implication that “par-
ents” with rights “on a basis of equality of men and women” would include both a man
and a woman parent.  This implication conveys a presumption of heterosexual coupling
as the basis for parenting.
192 See, e.g., CEDAW Treaty, supra note 6, at art. 12 (discussing medical care for R
women during pregnancy and confinement, but also asserting that access to health care
should be provided “on as basis of equality of men and women”).
193 Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) [hereinafter CRC Treaty].
194 Id. at art. 24 § 2(d).
195 By way of example, Article 2, Section 2 of the CRC Treaty states that “States
Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is protected against all
forms of discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status, activities, expressed
opinions, or beliefs of the child’s parents, legal guardians, or family members.” (empha-
sis added). Id. at art. 2 § 2.
196 See id. at arts. 9, 10, 18.
197 YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES, supra note 176. R
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such to prevent the legal recognition of a person’s gender identity.”198  Like-
wise, Principle Thirteen references parenthood only to require that states
provide equal access to parental status “without discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation or gender identity.”199  Significantly, the Principles
avoid sexedness and references to dyadic couples or parental units.
In sum, international law references parenting in compelling ways with
regard to protecting women from pregnancy and maternity discrimination.
Surprisingly, CEDAW contains several provisions that do not solely protect
women’s rights, but also emphasize the equality of parents.  Both CEDAW
and CRC rely not only on implicit presumptions of male-female parents but
also on the heterosexual dyadic nature of parenting.  The Yogyakarta Princi-
ples move far beyond this; there is no sexedness, except to refer to prohib-
ited forms of stereotyping, and no presumptions of dyadic parenting.
4. Internalization of International Parenting Norms
International law, especially human rights law, has been subject to
strong critiques surrounding a lack of compliance.  The norms, critics con-
tend, are aspirational at best.  Countries do, to some extent, internalize these
international norms, leading to some legitimization and institutionalization
of human rights.200  However, they internalize norms in different ways.  In
addition to encouraging states to adopt international norms, international law
can encourage internalization through transnational networks of activists and
individuals,201 as well as through acculturation and selective adaptation.202
Semi-formal and informal networks of women’s rights advocates can foster
change in several national contexts with specific connections to CEDAW’s
provisions.  In these contexts, CEDAW has served to both inspire action and
further legitimize national women’s advocacy movements.203  Cultural differ-
198 Id. at 12.
199 Id. at 19.
200 CEDAW’s norms inspire a range of reactions from fully compliant internalization
to disdainful evasion.  Only when States internalize international law do they establish
domestic legal obligations.  Harold Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106
YALE L.J. 2599, 2659 (1997) (noting that an “obligation to obey an international norm
becomes an internally binding domestic legal obligation when that norm has been inter-
preted and internalized into [a State’s] domestic legal system.”).  Without internalization,
CEDAW lacks substantial impact.  Along with Koh, other scholars have theorized how
States internalize international law. See, e.g., Rex Glensey, Quasi-Global Social Norms,
38 CONN. L. REV. 79, 86–87 (2005) (describing how “transnational norm entrepreneurs”
facilitate internalization in both their home countries and abroad); Goodman & Jinks,
supra note 180, at 638–56 (explaining how institutions can harness acculturation, the R
process in which individuals and groups adopt beliefs and behaviors of a surrounding
culture, to drive internalization).
201 See MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: AD-
VOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 1–10 (1998).
202 See, e.g., Goodman & Jinks, supra note 180, at 638–56; Rosenblum, Internalizing R
Gender, supra note 20, at 824. R
203 See generally Rosenblum, Internalizing Gender, supra note 20 (examining the R
utility of comparative methodologies in analyzing the process by which nations internal-
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ences surface within and across national boundaries, and State and non-State
actors engage in political behavior based on multiple rationalities.  Although
some international scholars may worry that cultural relativism challenges the
viability of universal international human rights norms,204 such norms have
found their way into domestic legal systems, often colored with local cul-
tural realities.205  While these cultural differences may distract observers
from the influence of international norms, internalization of these norms
does occur.
In a previous article, I argue that CEDAW faces particular challenges
during the process of internalization.206  This phenomenon applies to all
human rights instruments; especially those that traverse the public-private
ize international norms, specifically considering how quotas for women’s representation
in France and Brazil illustrate the power of international legal instruments in different
State contexts).  CEDAW’s Article 7 requires parties “to eliminate discrimination against
women in the political and public life of the country.”  CEDAW Treaty, supra note 6, at R
art. 7.  In the early 1990s, Brazilian feminists drew on the international women’s rights
movement to address the fact that women accounted for only a small percentage of the
country’s representation in government. See CLARA ARAU´JO, QUOTAS FOR WOMEN IN
THE BRAZILIAN LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM 1 (2003), available at http://www.quotaproject.org/
CS/CS_Araujo_Brazil_25-11-2003.pdf.  Feminists persuaded the legislature to pass a
statute requiring each political party to set aside at least 30 percent of its nominations for
candidates of each sex.  Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under article 18 of the Convention
on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Combined initial,
second, third, fourth, and fifth periodic reports of States Parties: Brazil, at 21, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/BRA/1-5, (Nov. 7, 2002), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/8985
86b1dc7b4043c1256a450044f331/29fa368c23666011c12572b20038b10a/$FILE/N02687
25.pdf.  Like Brazil, France took little action to fulfill its responsibilities under Article 7
until it passed the Parity Law in 2000.  Loi 2000-493 du 6 juin 2000 tendant a` favoriser
l’´egal acce`s des femmes et des hommes aux mandats e´lectoraux et fonctions e´lectives
[Law 2000-493 of June 6, 2000 to facilitate equal access for men and women to electoral
mandates and elective functions], available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/
UnTexteDeJorf?numjo=INTX9900134L.  France’s Parity Law imposes a 50 percent re-
quirement with two kinds of enforcement mechanisms, which vary depending on the
election in question. Id at arts. 14–15.  Overall, France’s Parity Law has proven more
effective than Brazil’s Quota Law—a difference that can be attributed to more powerful,
though imperfect, enforcement mechanisms.  I argue that key differences in implementa-
tion derive, in part, from the variation in the construction of gender in these two different
countries.  Rosenblum, Internalizing Gender, supra note 20, at 800.  Regarding Parity’s R
efficacy, see generally, ELE´ONORE LE´PINARD, L’E´GALITE´ INTROUVABLE. LA PARITE´, LES
FE´MINISTES ET LA RE´PUBLIQUE (2007).
204 For a discussion on the influence of cultural relativism, see CHARLESWORTH &
CHINKIN, supra note 181, at 222–29.  They note that some scholars reject cultural relativ- R
ism because it retards the development of universal standards. See id. at 222–23 (citing
Fernando Teso´n, International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism, 25 VA. J. INT’L L.
869 (1985)).
205 See Rosenblum, Internalizing Gender, supra note 20, at 759, 821–25.  For exam- R
ple, French and Brazilian internalization of international norms, like women’s suffrage,
appear distinct, yet international law has still impacted both countries domestic laws. See
id. at 788–99.  Variations between countries may be the result of different modes of inter-
nalization, including transnational networks of activists and individuals, acculturation,
and selective adaptation; however, this does not diminish the impact of internalization.
See id. at 821–25.
206 See id. at 807.
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divide: “[d]ifferentiation among legal cultures may lead to divergent inter-
nalizations of the same international norm.”207  In that article, I show how
the differences between Brazilian and French cultural gender constructions
play out in remedies adopted pursuant to CEDAW.208  I argue that cultural
difference creates possibilities for new norms that do not simply project one
cultural framework onto the world political stage.209  This is an example of
the centrality of comparative knowledge—we see that different countries
implement international treaties in vastly different ways.  Although unsexed
parenting may constitute a norm with some universalist aspirations, I want to
be explicit that I recognize that implementation of this norm will necessarily
vary across national borders.210
The relationship between international norms and domestic internaliza-
tion of those norms cannot easily be described as causal.  International
norms regarding parenting, however, may play a meaningful role in state
adoption of legislation that correlates to international standards.  Of course,
such norms have no formal influence if a state is not a party to a convention,
as is the case with the United States and both CEDAW and CRC.  Nonethe-
less, the example of the United States, when contrasted with that of Sweden,
demonstrates the challenge of assessing whether a facially sex-neutral law
promotes “unsexing.”
B. Thin Unsexing—the United States’ Family and Medical Leave Act
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 2601 et seq., was signed into law on February 5, 1993.  Congress sought
to aid in “the development of children and the family unit that fathers and
mothers be able to participate in early childrearing and the care of family
members who have serious health conditions.”211  The FMLA requires em-
ployers to allow employees to take up to twelve weeks of time off.212  Be-
207 Id.
208 Id. at 809.
209 Id. at 801.
210 Fernanda Nicola makes this point in a particularly eloquent fashion in her recent
piece.  Fernanda Nicola, Family Law Exceptionalism in Comparative Law, 58 AM. J.
COMP. L. 777 (2011). In this article, she criticizes modern international human rights
lawyers and their comparative family law projects that aim to create harmonious reform
on issues like abortion, same-sex marriage, transsexual, and adoption rights. See id.  Ni-
cola resists these universalist projects, suggesting that comparative family law should
favor legal pluralism “not because of a single social purpose, but rather through a multi-
plicity of local and global factors, both internal and external to family law.” Id. at
809–10.  Nicola shows that “family law reforms should not be about only moral values
and universal rights but, just like reforms of the market, about their economic and distrib-
utive consequences as well.” Id. at 810.  I recognize the unsexing project’s universalist
tone, and indeed it draws on the Yogyakarta Principles.  However, nation states internal-
ize international law using nationally and culturally variant forms to reflect these differ-
ences. See Rosenblum, Internalizing Gender, supra note 20, at 787–88. R
211 Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(2) (2006).
212 Id. at § 2612(a)(1).
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cause employees must satisfy a number of criteria to be eligible for parental
leave under the FMLA, including employment at a company with fifty or
more employees, only “roughly 50 percent of the workforce is covered.”213
Moreover, the FLMA only required unpaid leave.214  As a result, some esti-
mate that as many as seventy-eight percent of eligible employees cannot
afford to take advantage of the FMLA.215  Moreover, the United States is the
only nation in the developed world without paid parental leave.216  And un-
fortunately, the fact that the leave is unpaid has a sexed impact: families
with a male breadwinner view men taking leave as a luxury beyond their
means.217
Although its language is entirely sex-neutral, one purpose behind the
FMLA was to advance women’s role in the workplace.218  The House Report
for the statute recognized that the typical family is no longer made up of a
working father and stay-at-home mother; rather, single mothers make up a
substantial portion of the workforce.219  Congressional findings state that,
“due to the nature of the roles of men and women in our society, the primary
responsibility for family caretaking often falls on women, and such responsi-
bility affects the working lives of women more than it affects the working
lives of men.”220
The FMLA’s structure explicitly sought to avoid allegations of discrimi-
nation.221  Congressional debate focused not on sex differentials, but rather
on the desirability of creating parental leave protections as a social guaran-
213 EICHNER, supra note 159, at 36. R
214 29 U.S.C. § 2612(c) (“[L]eave granted under [this section] may consist of un-
paid leave.”); see also Chuck Halverson, From Here to Paternity: Why Men Are Not
Taking Paternity Leave Under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 18 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J.
257, 258 (2003).
215 EICHNER, supra note 159, at 36. R
216 Jennifer Ludden, U.S. Only Industrialized Nation With No Paid Leave for New
Parents, NPR (June 17, 2010), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2010/06/17/127904
924/u-s-now-only-industrialized-nation-without-paid-leave-for-new-parents.
217 Halverson, supra note 214, at 258 (identifying “financial obstacles” as one of the R
reasons why men do not take leave under the FMLA).
218 Id.
219 H.R. REP. NO. 103–8(I), at 20 (1993).  The report predicted that women would
make up forty-seven percent of the American work force by 2005, and that “two-thirds of
women with preschool-aged children and three quarters of women with school-age chil-
dren” would be in the work force in 1995. Id.  The FMLA aimed to address these
changes that shifted the cultural makeup of families in the 1990s. See id.
220 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(5).
221 Significantly, the House Report itself argues that the FMLA does not discriminate
on the basis of sex. H.R. REP. NO. 103–8(I), supra note 219, at 32.  It states that “[the R
FMLA] covers not only women of childbearing age, but all employees, young and old,
male and female, who suffer from a serious health condition, or who have a family mem-
ber with such a condition.” Id.  The Report notes at least one reason why men are in-
cluded under the FMLA: “[a] law providing special protection to women or any defined
group, in addition to being inequitable, runs the risk of causing discriminatory treatment.
[The FMLA], by addressing the needs of all workers, avoids such a risk.” Id.
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tee.222  One example of the limits of this neutrality is that while the FMLA
allows an employee to take unpaid leave to care for children of his or her
same-sex partner, regardless of how the child comes to the family, the rela-
tionship status of the couple, or the legal relationship between the person
taking leave and the child, it does not permit same-sex partners to take leave
to care for each other.223
The FMLA is thinly unsexed.  It has no provisions that discriminate or
prefer one sex over another—it merely requires employers to provide leave.
However, the FMLA’s nominal sex neutrality becomes a sexed reality due to
overpowering default rules that govern its implementation.  As Elizabeth
Emens argues:
[D]efault rules affect the choices that parties make across widely
varying domains, from organ donations to pension plans to corpo-
rate antitakeover measures.  For instance, across these varied do-
mains, defaults are often “sticky.”  That is, parties often choose
whatever option is set as the default.  Thus, even when private
parties choose, the law shapes behavior by the way it frames those
choices.224
Social defaults, like legal defaults, affect the choices of private parties by
framing those choices in a particular way.  Although money and stigma are
not enforceable rules, they influence one’s decisions just the same: when a
male parent decides whether to take leave under the FMLA, his decision is
framed by the sexual norms inherent in these social defaults.  The FMLA’s
sex neutrality thus leaves the sexedness or unsexedness entirely in the hands
of individuals and their employers,225 allowing social defaults to determine
that women will be the primary beneficiaries of the Act.  Because of social
defaults that encourage men not to take leave, the thin unsexedness of the
FMLA’s language has not translated into a sex-neutral family-leave sys-
222 Debate on the House and Senate floors were largely devoid of any discussion over
the inclusion of men in this bill. See, e.g., 139 CONG. REC. H557–03 (Feb. 4, 1993).
Instead, Senators and Representatives argued over the need for the federal government to
intervene and the economic effects of the bill. Id.
223 M.V. LEE BADGETT, THE WILLIAMS INST., THE IMPACT OF EXPANDING LEAVE
RIGHTS TO CARE FOR CHILDREN OF SAME-SEX PARTNERS 1 (2010), available at http://
wiwp.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Badgett-FMLA-Jun-2010.pdf (noting that while
the FMLA requires leave to care for the children of a same-sex partner, it does not allow
leave to care for a same-sex partner).
224 Emens, supra note 11, at 763. R
225 See id.  Default rules may be counteracted by proactive state policy.  Such efforts
do not necessarily intrude on the family.  Maxine Eichner argues the contrary, that state
policy limiting coercion by the marketplace on a family increases privacy and family
autonomy. EICHNER, supra note 159, at 65.  Limiting mandatory working hours, paid R
time off for childcare, and prohibiting employers from firing parents who refuse to work
overtime allow families the institutional space to make important family decisions with-
out being held captive by the market. See id.
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tem.226  Of the many reasons for men’s failure to take parental leave,227 two
stand out—money and stigma.  Not surprisingly, data reveals that more wo-
men take advantage of parental leave.228
These social defaults have prevented new parents from invoking the
FMLA: men continue to rely on vacation time for parental leave, taking an
average of only ten days off.229  Although private corporate initiatives tout
their attempts to raise male paternity leave, recent data suggests only luke-
warm success.230  The thin neutrality of the FMLA simply serves to reinforce
social divisions between men and women.231  In a heterosexual two-parent
household, financial incentives heavily favor the man working and the wo-
man caretaking.  In adopting a neutral stance with regard to the division of
labor, the FMLA reinforces pressure on men to continue working, leaving
only women to take leave.  This is because men earn more money and the
family cannot afford to lose this income through unpaid leave, so pressures
leave men working and women at home—the same as before the FMLA.232
In addition to the fact that unpaid leave is a luxury many families can-
not afford, men who take leave to care for children face substantial stigma—
masculinity stereotypes construct men as breadwinners.233  Through bearing
the responsibility of family finances, many men spend less time with their
226 The primary goal of the law was not to change the societal demands on men as
caregivers, but “to promote the goal of equal employment opportunity for women and
men.”  29 U.S.C. § 2601.  In other words, the FMLA did not attempt to correct the dis-
crepancy between those taking maternity and those taking paternity leave, but to protect
employees, irrespective of their gender, from risking employment in order to care for
children, sick family members, or the elderly.
227 There are many theories as to why men fail to take leave under the FMLA.  One
commentator argues that five obstacles impede men’s use of parental leave: (1) the stigma
of taking leave; (2) financial reasons for not taking unpaid leave; (3) ignorance of the
law; (4) administrative burdens on employers that serve as obstacles for men taking
leave; and (5) the lack of any legislative intent to encourage fathers to bond with their
newborns.  Halverson, supra note 214, at 261. R
228 Id. at 259–61.
229 The 2000 U.S. Department of Labor statistics showed that only 13.5% of male and
19.8% of female employees took family leave. Id. at 260.  It also showed that women
comprised 58.1% of leave takers in general.  Id.  The survey was conducted over five
years and the trend showed that overall the percentage of male leave takers in general
declined by almost two percent (43.8% to 41.9%) while women leave takers increased by
the same increment (56.2% to 58.1%). Id. at 260.  The stigma of taking parental leave
may lead men to count such leave as vacation time.
230 For example, Ernst & Young created an internal campaign in 2006, featuring se-
nior manager Rob McLeod, age 32, speaking enthusiastically about his experience when
he took four weeks of paternity leave.  The purpose of this campaign was to help men
feel more comfortable with taking advantage of family-friendly benefits.  Karen Holt,
Good for the Gander, WORKING MOTHER, Oct. 2008, at 92. But see FMLA: Facts and
Statistics, AAUW, http://www.aauw.org/act/laf/library/fmlastatistics.cfm (last visited
Oct. 23, 2011) (58% of employees who took leave in 2007 were women; 42% were men).
231 Lindsay R. B. Dickerson, “Your Wife Should Handle It”: The Implicit Messages of
the Family and Medical Leave Act, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 429, 435 (2005) (arguing
that the provisions of the FMLA “do not challenge the discriminatory structures of fam-
ily and work that were in place prior to its enactment”).
232 See id. at 440–41.
233 Id. at 429–31.
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children and may be perceived as “less attached.”234  Under these circum-
stances, it is unsurprising that parenthood remains a highly gendered institu-
tion in Western culture.  With respect to childcare for newborns, “men
receive subtle messages from employers that their place is at the office and
their wives’ responsibility is child care.”235  A double standard thrives as
successful men face pressure to work even immediately after a child’s birth,
while women face pressure to take as much time off as possible.  Mothers
who succeed at work are perceived as bad mothers, while fathers are only
viewed as successful if they achieve at work.236  In addition, all of these roles
become exacerbated given the relatively high number of hours United States
citizens work weekly.237
The FMLA’s neutral language fails to translate into a neutral-function-
ing policy precisely because of these market realities and concomitant sex
stereotypes.  One study argues that the technological progress that has taken
place in the second half of the twentieth century should have eliminated the
wage gap by 1970, but that gender stereotypes have prevented this shift.238
Central among these stereotypes is the presumption that women must be
responsible for parenting.  Based on complicated gender structures in the
United States, women generally step down from work to care for children in
two-income households.239  In the aggregate, even short withdrawals from
the workforce have substantial effects on women’s economic equality.240
These stereotypes create a self-perpetuating inequality—if employers
believe that women are mostly responsible for household work, then they
expect women to put less time and effort into their jobs and therefore offer
them lower paying jobs and earnings.241  For this reason, more generous ma-
234 Halverson, supra note 214, at 262. R
235 Id. In fact, “many law firms . . . require male employees to show that they are the
primary caregiver [of a child] before allowing them to take paternity leave.” Id.
236 Id. at 263; see also Keith Cunningham, Father Time: Flexible Work Arrangements
and the Law Firm’s Failure of the Family, 53 STAN. L. REV. 967, 973 (2001) (arguing that
male lawyers will not adopt alternative work schedules that allow them to engage in
family responsibilities if upper management does not “honor a man’s simultaneous com-
mitments as lawyer and father”).
237 U.S. workers log far more hours, an average of 1,966 per year, than other industri-
alized nations.  EICHNER, supra note 159, at 39.  By way of example, Swedish workers R
spend an average of 1,552 hours working annually, while French (1,656), German
(1,560), and Canadian (1,732) workers also spend significantly less time working than
Americans. Id.  American parents spend a combined average of eighty hours per week at
their jobs, while Swedish couples only spend sixty-nine hours per week. Id. at 40.
238 Stefania Albanesi & Claudia Olivetti, Gender Roles and Technological Progress,
VOX (July 20, 2007), http://voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/402.
239 EICHNER, supra note 159, at 41. R
240 Id.
241 More women than men take time off from work, work part time, cannot go into
work early, or cannot stay later at work.  David Leonhardt, A Labor Market Punishing to
Mothers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/04/business/econ-
omy/04leonhardt.html.  Taking time off from work is penalized with reductions in pay,
promotions, or loss of specific career paths. Id.  Jane Waldfogel, a professor at Columbia
University who specializes in families and work, said, “[w]omen do almost as well as
men today . . . as long as they don’t have children.” Id.  While the career price assessed
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ternal leave policies may prove counterproductive as they reinforce the divi-
sion of labor that places women in the home.242  Several scholars argue that a
policy of paid parental leave alone would substantially improve the ability of
men and alternative families to take parental leave.243
In short, the FMLA’s guarantee of equal access to family leave without
regard to sex provides the thinnest of protections.  This guarantee exists at
the level of formal law, but is handily undermined by a set of social default
rules that predominate in the “free market” context of the United States.
This thinness subjects the sex neutral provisions of the Act to the vagaries of
different employers and substantial market differentials between sexes, clas-
ses, and races.  In practice, it achieves little in assuring access to leave at a
universal level, particularly when compared with the more assertive Swedish
parental leave regime.
C. Thick Unsexing—the Swedish Context
Sweden’s parental leave policy is generally considered to be both com-
prehensive and creative.244  Its goal is “getting mom a job and making dad
for taking time off in a career is similar between men and women, women are more likely
to take time off. See id.  Women who had no children and never took time off had careers
that resembled those of men. Id.  The effect on women who do have children is their exit
from the workplace toward full-time parenting because they cannot find a part-time job.
See id.  Some policy propositions to remedy this situation are universal preschool pro-
grams, paid parental leave policies, or a policy that gives workers the right to request a
switch to part-time or to have a flexible schedule. See id.
242 See Rosenblum, Unsex CEDAW, supra note 4, at 1. For example, June Carbone R
argues that paid parental leave is critical for parental relationships. CAHN & CARBONE,
supra note 123, at 84.  She argues for “incentives such as paid family leave that might R
encourage fathers to join mothers in newborn care” and establishing “paternity and child
support obligations, with less of the onus of initiating action placed on the mother.” Id.
at 84. See also Dickerson, supra note 231, at 447 (arguing that California’s Paid Family R
Leave Program has succeeded as a “viable first step” towards equality in the workplace
because it tears down the economic barrier for men).
243 See Rosenblum, Unsex CEDAW, supra note 4, at 6  For example, June Carbone R
argues that paid parental leave is critical for parental relationships. CAHN & CARBONE,
supra note 123, at 84.  She argues for “incentives such as paid family leave that might R
encourage fathers to join mothers in newborn care” and establishing “paternity and child
support obligations, with less of the onus of initiating action placed on the mother.” Id.
at 84. See also Dickerson, supra note 231, at 447 (arguing that California’s Paid Family R
Leave Program has succeeded as a “viable first step” towards equality in the workplace
because it tears down the economic barrier for men).
244 See Michelle Ashamalla, A Swedish Lesson in Parental Leave Policy, 10 B.U.
INT’L L.J. 241, 243 (1993); see also FO¨RA¨LDRALEDIGHETSLAG (Svensk fo¨rfattning-
ssamling [SFS] 1995:584) (Swed.), English translation of Parental Leave Act available
at http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/10/49/85/f16b785a.pdf.  Several countries
have begun to consider adopting versions of Sweden’s law to extend parental leave with
gender restrictions. See JOHN EKBERG, RICKARD ERIKSSON & GUIDO FRIEBEL, PARENTAL
LEAVE—A POLICY EVALUATION OF THE SWEDISH “DADDY-MONTH” REFORM 2 (2005),
available at http://ftp.iza.org/dp1617.pdf. Denmark, Italy, and Norway require “at least
one month of the extension is a ‘use it or lose it’ option for fathers.” Id. In Austria,
parents get two years of extended leave, but only if the father uses at least six months. Id.
Iceland allocates three months each to fathers and mothers and three months to share. Id.
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pregnant”—a deliberate use of public policy to unsex work and caretak-
ing.245  Under this policy, two employed parents are entitled to a combined
sixteen months of parental leave.246  Either parent may use this benefit or
apportion it.247  To encourage paternal involvement in child rearing, Sweden
requires that each parent take two months of the time allowance, with the
remainder available to either parent.248  The first three hundred and ninety
days are paid at eighty percent of a normal salary, while the remaining
ninety days are paid at a flat fixed rate.249  Each parent’s parental leave may
be taken simultaneously or consecutively.250  As such, this provision allows
parents to decide if they want to enjoy the luxury of both parents taking care
of the baby or conserve resources and have the parents care for the child in a
consecutive manner.  In addition, both parents have the option to return to
work on part-time basis until the child reaches the age of eight.251  The state
also maintains a highly developed system of daycare facilities, which ease
the transition back to the workforce.252  Parents even benefit from a guaran-
teed departure time from their work.253
Rather than focusing on gender as the primary basis for receiving bene-
fits, the Swedish system emphasizes a child’s ability to spend equal time
with both parents. The Swedish gender-neutral system “alleviates feminist
concerns about disparate treatments involved with ‘maternity’ leave” be-
cause it does not penalize women who desire both a career and children.254
Prior to the enactment of the current provisions, men were mostly reluctant
to take parental leave because of traditional sex roles.255  To address the lack
of social acceptability for fathers taking paternity leave, the “feminists pro-
posed that the Swedish government mandate paternity leave.”256
Sweden’s parental leave policy is a thick unsexing provision—it recog-
nizes the extent to which social defaults (here against men taking parental
245 Roger Klinth, The Best of Both Worlds?  Fatherhood and Gender Equality in
Swedish Parental Leave Campaigns, 1976-2006, 6 FATHERING 20, 20 (2008).
246 Id. at 22; see also 4–5 § FO¨RA¨LDRALEDIGHETSLAG (SFS 1995:584) (Swed.), En-
glish translation available at http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/10/49/85/f16b785a.
pdf; Gender Equality: the Swedish Approach to Fairness, SWEDEN.SE, http://www.swe-
den.se/eng/Home/Society/Equality/Facts/Gender-equality-in-Sweden/ (last visited, Nov.
6, 2011).
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Ashamalla, supra note 244, at 243. R
252 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: SWEDEN, (July 19, 2011) http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2880.htm (“Sweden has an extensive child-care system that
guarantees a place for all young children ages two through six in a public day-care
facility.”)
253 See Gender Equality: the Swedish Approach to Fairness, supra note 246. R
254 Ashamalla, supra note 244, at 243–44. R
255 See id. at 244.
256 Id.  There is some debate over the extent to which the Swedish law actually incen-
tivizes men to acquire the “human capital needed for child care.” EKBERG, ERIKSSON &
FRIEBEL, supra note 244, at 2–3. R
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leave) determine outcomes, and directly incentivizes behavior to counter the
drag-down effect of these defaults.  At the same time, it is worth noting that
while this is a thick provision, it is also noncoercive: parents may prefer to
maintain the leave as taken solely by one parent, but they would lose the
right to some of their leave.  The other interesting element in the Swedish
law is that it requires some balance: for both parents to get the full eighteen
months, the parent taking less leave must take at least two months.  Because
of this, in heterosexual families where the man takes more leave, the woman
must take at least two months.  In this sense, the provision consistently pur-
sues unsexing.  And yet, even with the state’s assertive posture, male em-
ployees are still more likely to take leave only if another father took leave
within the previous two years.257
Public campaigns attempted to subvert traditional gendered notions of
men’s and women’s responsibilities: “[m]en’s identity, as well as citizen-
ship, was redefined; men were supposed to be fathers, not just breadwin-
ners.”258  However, it has also been argued that the public campaigns to sell
men on parenting involve constructions of masculinity259 and an emphasis on
heteronormativity.260  Nevertheless, Sweden’s promotion of caregiving as a
masculine endeavor may serve to unsex parenting by creating space for men
to be fathers.
The policy does not presume the sex of the parents, nor does it differen-
tiate between them—in a different-sex couple, the man could take more
leave than the woman, all of it paid.  As such, Sweden’s system is fully
neutral, even though it presumes only two parents.261  This is distinct from
other systems in Europe that favor maternity leave over a sex-neutral paren-
tal leave.262
Yet the Sweden parental leave policy is not merely sex neutral, but
unsexed.  By incentivizing some balance between parents in assuming re-
sponsibilities, Sweden’s law succeeded in initiating a more egalitarian divi-
sion of home labor by strongly encouraging men to stay at home with the
baby for two months.  Sweden does not merely permit balanced childcare
257 Linda Haas & C. Philip Hwang, Is Fatherhood Becoming More Visible at Work?
Trends in Corporate Support for Fathers Taking Parental Leave in Sweden, 7 FATHERING
303, 305 (2009).
258 Klinth, supra note 245, at 26. R
259 Id. at 27 (discussing how campaign makers used “masculine figures like weight
lifters and male-coded implements” in an effort to “create a social position acceptable to
men”).
260 Id. (“In campaigns, the new father was firmly placed within the context of the
heterosexual nuclear family.  Alternative family forms such as single parenthood, gay or
lesbian families, were excluded.”).
261 Such laws that favor couples inevitably put families with single parents or multi-
ple parents at a disadvantage.
262 Sweden and a few other countries provide parental leave that is sex neutral, but
most European countries continue to provide maternity leave that is separate from paren-
tal leave. La famille en Europe, UNION DES FAMILLES, http://www.uniondesfamilles.org/
conge-maternite.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2011).
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but encourages it.  By the early 1990s, almost fifty percent of men with
children took paternity leave.263  As more men took paternity leave, it be-
came more socially acceptable and created a virtuous cycle where men in-
creasingly began to take the leave.264  This model promotes social
advancement and results in less hiring discrimination because parental leave
no longer strongly favors women’s caretaking responsibilities.  When men
are encouraged to take leave, employers no longer presume that female em-
ployees are more costly than male employees.
The generosity of its provisions has proven to be highly effective in
diminishing workplace discrimination based on gender and traditional
parenting roles. Sweden’s parental leave policy has many salubrious effects.
For men, the effects involve discovery of the joys of parenting, more equita-
ble participation in family responsibilities, and more time with children.265
Employers expect employees to take leave without regard to gender and re-
frain from penalizing parents in promotions.266  Because women are no
longer the only parents taking leave, their paychecks have improved.267
Some even perceive that participation by men has led to lower divorce rates
and increased joint custody of children after divorce.268
The introduction of required leave for fathers in 1995 marked a huge
shift.  There was no mandate that fathers had to stay home, but if fathers did
not, the family would lose a month (now two months) of parental leave
subsidies.269  The rate of fathers taking leave went from six percent to eighty-
five percent.270  Fostering choice for men, a central element in public rela-
tions campaigns prior to 2001, reinforced the notion of “active fatherhood as
something out of the ordinary.”271  Only after particular choices were en-
couraged did the law achieve its greater success.  Thanks to women’s new-
found ability to flourish in the workplace while parenting, “housewife”
263 Klinth, supra note 245, at 22 (46% of new fathers took leave during period imme- R
diately before 1995 reform); but see Haas & Hwang, supra note 257, at 304 (noting that R
although 90% of fathers took leave in 2007, mothers still took 79% of the total leave
days).
264 Klinth, supa note 245, at 33–34 (noting that cultural depictions of men as fathers R
was a necessary precondition to maintstream acceptance by men of paternal leave).
265 Katrin Bennhold, In Sweden, Men Can Have It All, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/10/world/europe/10iht-sweden.html?scp=1&sq=swe-
den%20fathers &st=cse [hereinafter Bennhold, Men Can Have It All].
266 See id.
267 See id.
268 See id.
269 Anna-Lena Almqvist, Why Most Swedish Fathers and Few French Fathers Use
Paid Parental Leave: An Exploratory Qualitative Study of Parents, 6 FATHERING 192,
194 (2008).
270 See Bennhold, Men Can Have It All, supra note 265. R
271 Klinth, supra note 245, at 30. R
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became a largely socially unacceptable position.272  Even so, work still re-
mains to shift attitudes in the corporate sector.273
D. Thin Versus Think Unsexing: Contrasting U.S. and Swedish Models
Both the FMLA in the United States and the Swedish parental leave
law attempt to achieve some form of sex neutrality.  They each do, to a
certain extent.  Formally, the FMLA’s text provides the guarantees that
would permit a person, regardless of biosex, to obtain the benefits of the
statute.  However, the FMLA stands out against a world in which all other
developed nations guarantee paid parental leave.  Because most families are
unwilling to choose to forego pay, whether an employee will be able to take
leave may depend solely on his or her relationship with the employer.  The
FMLA leaves the provision of paid leave to the market and employer’s dis-
cretion, with obvious consequences.  Women, whose employment often pays
less, can least afford to take leave.  Because the FMLA permits paid leave,
but does not force employers to provide it or employees to take it, financial
concerns prevent men from taking parental leave.  Many economists point
out that maternity leave policies, or even sex-neutral policies that favor wo-
men, lead to hiring fewer women, as well as the reinforcement of sexist
norms of work and income.274  To the extent that women are more likely to
take maternity leave, employers view them as more expensive and therefore
expendable employees.275  A sex- and gender-neutral model can reflect wo-
men’s biological realities in parenting, but still provide for men’s equal par-
ticipation in parenting.  Default rules draw on stereotypes that portray men
272 Katrin Bennhold, The Stigma of Being a Housewife, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/21/world/europe/21iht-LETTER.html?scp=2&sq=
sweden%20fathers&st=cse.
273 Haas and Hwang, supra note 257, state: R
Our surveys also make it clear that the majority of large Swedish companies are
still not supportive of fathers taking parental leave.  The majority have not made a
formal decision to support fathers taking leave, implemented special programs to
encourage fathers to take leave, kept records about fathers’ leave use or designated
someone to encourage fathers to take leave. . . .  The majority of companies in
2006 still reported that co-workers and managers typically did not react positively
to fathers who wanted to take leave and that most fathers did not yet take much
leave. . . .  Will the worsening economy stall progress even more?  During the last
recession, our 1993 study found that companies concerned with productivity and
cost-cutting provided less formal and informal support to fathers who wanted to
take parental leave.
Id. at 318–19.
274 See, e.g., Catherine Hakim, The mother of all paradoxes, PROSPECT MAG., Nov.
18, 2009, http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2009/11/the-mother-of-all-paradoxes/
(noting Swedish economists see maternity leave as a glass ceiling for women in the labor
workplace).
275 In this sense, the stereotypes reinforce men’s financial advantage over women.
The benefit from this stereotype does not, however, ameliorate the cost of not having
time with their families.
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as unsuited to familial and caretaking roles, thus causing women to take
parental leave more readily than men.  The power of default rules leaves the
FMLA’s neutrality thin and not thick, formal rather than substantive.  In the
end, the protections of the FMLA fail to advance unsexing with any
consistency.
Scandinavian models reflect the importance of shared parenting for
greater economic equality, as well as for equality in the home.  The Swedish
policy attempts to remove sex from employers’ equations precisely by ad-
dressing sex.  The requirement that both parents take at least two months off
to get the maximum benefit under the statute encourages men to take paren-
tal leave.  This provision has led to widespread engagement by fathers in
their children’s daily caretaking. By emphasizing the connection between
masculinity and childcare, Sweden’s policy helps ensure that traditionally
gendered men can engage in childcare without fearing social disapproval.  In
short, Sweden has engineered a shift in family structures, one that has a
direct impact on the viability of attempts to promote women’s equality in the
workplace.
The Swedish law also demonstrates the interrelatedness of regulation of
the family and the market.  Although the private sector continues to pursue
affirmative action for women, it has not transformed women’s home lives—
women obtain work, but continue to bear the responsibility of home man-
agement and childrearing.276  The Swedish policy demonstrates the extent to
which remedying inequality in the family can reduce market inequalities.
Sweden set a goal to balance parental responsibility and foster the effective
childcare necessary for a newborn.  Incentivizing leave for both parents min-
imizes gender asymmetries in the allocation of parental responsibilities and
“decreases the potential for statistical discrimination that leads to gender
inequalities in wages.”277
Indeed, a truly thick understanding of unsexed parenting would include
not only an awareness of the default rules regarding parenting, but the re-
lated legal systems implicated in family life—notably those of economic life
and the corporation.  Scholars attribute Swedish women’s reduced financial
dependence on men to parental leave policies that equalize treatment.278  For
that reason, it is worth noting the example of Norway, which instituted a
quota of forty percent of the minority sex’s representation on corporate
boards.279  The quota applied to all publicly traded corporations, and was to
276 A Guide to Womenomics, ECONOMIST, Apr. 12, 2006, http://www.economist.com/
node/6802551 (noting that women do most work at home in addition to their “public”
work).
277 Albanesi & Olivetti, supra note 238. R
278 Klinth, supra note 245, at 23. R
279 See The Act Relating to Gender Equality, GOVERNMENT.NO: INFORMATION FROM
THE GOVERNMENT AND THE MINISTRIES, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/doc/Laws/Acts/
The-Act-relating-to-Gender-Equality-the-.html?id=454568 (last visited Nov. 13, 2011)
[hereinafter Act Relating to Gender Equality] (Norwegian statute containing corporate
board quota provision). See also Rosenblum, Feminizing Capital, supra note 14. R
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be enforced with the draconian punishment of dissolution for noncompli-
ance.280  Its success has inspired other countries to follow suit.281 Where wo-
men take parental leave far more frequently than men, it exacerbates their
absence in management, leaving corporate hierarchies sexed male.  By ac-
celerating the integration of women in corporate hierarchies, corporate board
quotas and other gender diversity efforts pursue the basic goal of balancing
gender in society.  Along the same lines, Sweden’s thickly unsexed parental
leave policy creates the conditions necessary for further sex integration in
the corporate sector.  As a corporate board quota seeks to feminize capital
from the boardroom down, Sweden’s parental leave policy feminizes capital
from the bassinet up.  By incentivizing parenting for men, it may serve to
unsex family leadership, thus fostering overall gender balance in society.
The Swedish parental leave policy serves as an example of how much
women actually benefit from paternal leave: an unsexed parental leave pol-
icy erodes the hold that men have over the workplace and serves to undercut
the economic incentive for hiring men over women.  An unsexed vision of
mothering, and indeed of parenting, can reflect women’s biological realities
in parenting while still providing for men’s equal participation in parenting,
thus furthering the overall goal of creating a society with a broader gender
balance.
CONCLUSION
The recent trend of courts, states, and countries around the world taking
steps to recognize same-sex couples’ rights gives new urgency to thinking
about unsexing mothering.  In 2010, Argentina and Mexico City legalized
marriage for same-sex couples,282 marking a major departure for two coun-
tries whose social norms were defined largely by the Catholic Church.  The
United States, now the only country in North America without marriage
equality, has been thrust into a nationwide debate thanks to the prominence
280 Act Relating to Gender Equality, supra note 279. R
281 France, for example, has recently adopted a similar quota system.  Daniel Scha¨fer
& Peggy Hollinger, Managers Hit Back at Female Board Quotas, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 20,
2011, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/915bac1e-3d15-11e0-bbff-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1
EdTBRsfY.  Spain and the Netherlands have also followed suit. See Bruce Crumley,
Boardroom Revolution, TIME, Apr. 26, 2010, available at http://www.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,1982304,00.html.
282 Alexei Barrionuevo, Argentina Approves Gay Marriage, in a First for Region,
N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/16/world/americas/16ar-
gentina.html?_r=1&ref=argentina; David Agren, Mexican States Ordered to Honor Gay
Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/11/world/amer-
icas/11mexico.html?scp=1&sq=mexico%20gay%20marriage&st=cse.
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of Perry v. Schwarzenegger,283 as well as recent federal decisions concerning
the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act.284
Sexed mothering persists, the many social forces that support the stere-
otype that parenting is a woman’s job.285  International law’s provisions re-
garding parenting provide some support for conceptualizing unsexed
parenting.  Comparative examinations of the construction of sex and parent-
ing offer contours of alternative legal norms and structures.  Crossing bor-
ders yields insight beyond national blinders.  Other countries’ public policy
choices serve to question the FMLA’s sex-neutrality and its purported defer-
ence to parents.  In the United States, we have assumed both that men do not
want to parent and that women prefer parenting—without asking either their
choice.  The Swedish example exposes how the state can nourish or mini-
mize purportedly fundamental sex differences.
Indeed, this is perhaps the Swedish example’s most important lesson—
the state’s choices, both explicit and default, play a central role in construct-
ing sex and gender, elements of our identity presumed to be intractable.  Ine-
quality is not a state of nature that must be accepted; state regulation of
corporations and families can foster or undermine equality.  A prime exam-
ple surfaces in Sweden’s Pre-School Curriculum, which states:
The ways in which adults respond to boys and girls, as well as the
demands and requirements imposed on children contribute to their
appreciation of gender differences.  The pre-school should work to
counteract traditional gender patterns and gender roles.  Girls and
boys in the pre-school should have the same opportunities to de-
velop and explore their abilities and interest without having limita-
tions imposed by stereotyped gender roles.286
This text is clear: adults who interact with children are responsible for their
understanding of gender.  The state, responsible for pre-school, has a clear
interest: “to counteract traditional gender patterns and gender roles.”  This
goes well beyond the anti-stereotyping purpose furthered in the United
States by interpretations of Titles VII and IX.287  Instead, it goes to the heart
of the promulgation of gender itself.  This is thick unsexing—of mothering,
and indeed of all childcare—perhaps at its most ambitious.
283 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
284 Charlie Savage & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, In Shift, U.S. Says Marriage Act Blocks
Gay Rights, Feb. 23, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/24/us/24marriage.html?
pagewanted=all.
285 The continuation of sexed parenting is also supported by continued restrictions on
non-traditional forms of parenting, such as restrictions on same-sex adoption.
286 SKOLVERKET, CURRICULUM FOR THE PRE-SCHOOL LPFO¨ 98 4 (2006), available at
http://www.boden.se/db/web/external.nsf/0/53A2A404E02B52A4C1257623006FC06D/
$file/L%E4roplan%20f%F6r%20f%F6rskolan%20p%E5%20engelska.pdf.
287 See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Ann Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (holding
that an employer cannot take an employee’s gender into account when making promotion
decisions).
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Unwinding parenting from biosex roles fosters family structures that
liberate traditionally sexed men and women.  Public debate over the wisdom
of gender neutral, but ineffective legislation, such as the FMLA, may shift
toward a distribution of resources that encourages families of all stripes to
fulfill their intergenerational responsibilities.  We cannot hope, like Dorothy
in Oz, that if we close our eyes and click our sequined heels while repeating
“no fixed notions of males and females”288 three times, that we will arrive,
miraculously, in an unsexed home.  Instead, we must assess and criticize
legal rules—explicit and default—to understand the way forward.
288 See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982).
